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FRAUD, LETTERS OF CREDIT, AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
IT IS TIME TO UNTETHER THE INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE
Richard E. Flint*
Taking advantage of the vulnerable is a leitmotif of fraud.
Competent people can protect themselves well enough
against most forms of fraud.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost eighty years ago, in the case of Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder
Banking Corp.,2 an appellate court in New York imposed a limit on the
independence principle3 in American letters of credit law by tethering it to a
*Albert Hermann Professor of Law, St. Mary's Law School.
'Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F.3d 1343, 1347 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
231 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Special Term 1941).
3The independence principle is fully explained in Section III of this Article. Briefly, however,
the independence principle is a doctrine in letters of credit law that provides that the undertaking of
an issuing bank of a letter of credit to the beneficiary is independent of the underlying contractual
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fraud inquiry.4 Specifically, the Sztejn case held that where a beneficiary's
fraud was known by the bank that issued the letter of credit prior to its
honoring the presentation, the independence of the bank's obligation to honor
the presentation would be limited such that the bank could be enjoined from
honoring the presentation even though the documents presented strictly
complied with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit.' There had been
earlier cases where there had been evidence of fraud or misrepresentation by
the beneficiary of a letter of credit, however, the decisions in those cases were
based on other grounds.6 Sztejn involved a sales contract for the purchase and
arrangement between the applicant of the letter of credit and the beneficiary of the letter of credit,
and is also independent of the reimbursement contract between the issuing bank and the applicant
for the letter of credit.
4 See, e.g., Alan Davidson, Fraud and the UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and
Standby Letters of Credit, I GEO. MASON J. INT'L COM. L. 25, 35 (2010) (asserting that the Sztejn
case "is regarded as the leading case on the fraud exception to the autonomy principle"); John F.
Dolan, Tethering the Fraud Inquiry in Letter of Credit Law, 21 BANKING & FIN. L. REv. 479, 487
(2005) (stating that common law courts recognized the Sztejn case "as playing a central role in the
fraud rule"); Gao Xiang & Ross P. Buckley, A Comparative Analysis of the Standard of Fraud
Required Under the Fraud Rule in Letter of Credit Law, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 293, 295
(2003) (recognizing that the seminal case of Sztejn v. J Henry Schroder Banking Corp. "has
influenced and shaped the fraud rule in virtually all jurisdictions worldwide"); Ross P. Buckley &
Xiang Gao, The Development of the Fraud Rule in Letter of Credit Law: The Journey so Far and
the Road Ahead, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 663, 676 (2003) (noting that the Sztejn case "has not
only been codified in the Uniform Commercial Code . . . but it has also been cited with approval or
followed throughout the common law world"). See also Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Tr. Bank,
336 A.2d 316, 325 (Pa. 1975) (asserting that the Sztejn case was "[t]he leading case on the question
of what conduct will justify an injunction against honor" of a letter of credit).
5Sztejn, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634. The Sztejn case will be fully discussed in Section IV ofthis Article.
601d Colony Tr. Co. v. Lawyers' Title & Tr. Co., 297 F. 152, 156-58 (2d Cir. 1924), cert.
denied, 265 U.S. 585 (1924) (holding in a breach of contract case that when the issuer knows that
the documents presented were false, "he cannot be called upon to recognize such a document as
complying with the terms of a letter of credit"); Higgins v. Steinhardter, 175 N.Y.S. 279, 280 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1919) (holding that although fraud was alleged in the documents presented to the issuer,
the court granted an injunction holding that there was a breach of contract such that payment under
the credit was unauthorized). However, a year later, the Appellate Division stated that it was of the
"opinion that the facts appearing in the opinion of that case (the Higgins case) did not warrant the
granting ofan injunction." Frey & Son, Inc. v. E.R. Sherburne Co., 184 N.Y.S. 661, 664 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1920) (stating that payment under letters of credit should not be interfered by courts for mere
breach of contract). See also Maurice O'Meara Co. v. Nat'l Park Bank of N.Y., 146 N.E. 636, 639
(N.Y. 1925) (holding that even when an issuer had reasonable doubts as to the quality of the goods
delivered, if the documents conformed to the terms of the letter of credit, the issuer was bound to
honor the presentation).
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sale of bristles by a New York buyer and a seller from India.7 While the
documents required by the letter of credit were facial in strict compliance
with the terms of the letter of credit, the buyer alleged that the documents
were false and that the seller had shipped rubbish instead of bristles.8 The
buyer sought to enjoin the bank from honoring the draft presented for
payment, alleging that although the bank had been advised of the fraud, it
was going to honor the presentation, as the documents conformed to the terms
of the letter of credit.9 The bank moved to have the case dismissed for failure
to state a cause of action."o Given the procedural status of the case, the
plaintiffs allegations were deemed true and were not subject to
contradiction." The court refused to dismiss the case,12 holding that a cause
of action for injunctive relief was stated because of the fraud in the underlying
sales transaction.13 In reaching its decision, the court stated that when a
seller's fraud was called to the bank's attention, the bank's obligation under
the letter of credit should not be "extend[ed] to protect the unscrupulous
seller."'4 From this humble beginning, the tethering of a fraud inquiry on the
independence principle in letters of credit law was birthed, and eventually
developed beyond those limited situations where the issuer had actual
knowledge of the beneficiary's fraud.
It will be the purpose of this Article to evaluate the efficacy of the fraud
exception" to the independence principle in letters of credit law in the case
of both commercial and standby letters of credit.'6 In doing so, a primary
'Sztejn, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
8Id.
'Id. at 632.
"ld. (alleging that the bank "is only concerned with the documents and, on their face, these
conform to the requirements of the letter of credit").
" Id. at 633 (stating also that "every intendment and fair inference is in favor of the pleading"
(citations omitted)).
12Id. at 636.
13 d. at 634 (noting that, given the status of the case, "it must be assumed that the seller has
intentionally failed to ship any goods ordered by the buyer").
14Id. at 634-35 (holding that the independence principle must give way in the case of fraud).
i 5Throughout the Article, the terms "fraud exception" and "fraud rule" are used
interchangeably. Furthermore, while this Article's focus is on fraud in the documents presented for
honor and material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant in a letter of credit transaction,
the same rules apply to the situation where there is a forgery in the documents presented for honor.
16Throughout the Article, the terms "commercial letter of credit" or "standby letter of credit"
may also be referred to as "commercial credit," "standby credit," or just "credit."
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focus will be to identify which of the various parties to a letter of credit
transaction the present fraud exception "protects," and to evaluate the policy
justifications for why these persons are viewed by the law to be eligible
recipients of protection.7
Once we can identify the original protected classes and fully understand
the policy justifications for such protection, this Article will then evaluate
whether these protections are justified in today's modem world with almost
instantaneous communications and unlimited access to worldwide financial
accounting information." While the policies justifying the fraud exception
may be just as valid today as they were in 1941, the method to achieve them
by use of the fraud exception is outdated, unrealistic, economically inefficient
in terms of time and money, and overly paternalistic in today's modern
world.19 A new and different method to achieve these policy justifications is
needed. This is especially true as the fraud exception is being increasingly
asserted by individuals or entities trying to escape from bad business deals
that, with planning and foresight, could have been avoided or prevented in
the first place. While the courts today are in large part correctly denying
injunctive relief, the time and effort expended in litigation does not justify
the continued tethering of the independence principle. Issuers should be free
"Several justifications have been posited for the existence of the fraud exception. See, e.g.,
Buckley & Gao, supra note 4, at 664-67 (listing three policy justifications for the fraud exception);
Menachem Mautner, Letter-of-Credit Fraud: Total Failure of Consideration, Substantial
Performance and the Negotiable Instrument Analogy, 18 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 579, 597-604
(1986) (justifying the fraud exception by noting the negative implications of not having a fraud
exception). Section V of this Article presents a thorough discussion and evaluation of these authors'
policy justifications.
18In the case of foreign public entities, there is the International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS), which is a set of accounting standards, developed by the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB), that is becoming the global standard for the preparation of public company financial
statements. The IASB is an independent accounting standards body, based in London. See
https://www.ifrs.com/index.htm. The mission of the IASB is to develop IFRS' Standards that bring
transparency, accountability, and efficiency to financial markets around the world. Our work serves
the public interest by fostering trust, growth, and long-term financial stability in the global economy.
See About Us, IRS (last visited Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.ifrs.org/about-us/.
"See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 4, at 481 (arguing for limits on the fraud rule by courts in order
to protect the independence principle so as not to destroy letters of credit as unique commercial
devices); John F. Dolan, Standby Letters of Credit and Fraud (Is the Standby Only Another invention
of the Goldsmiths in Lombard Street?), 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) (arguing that fraud in the
transaction under the Prior U.C.C. Article 5 should not be read to refer to the underlying transaction,
but solely to the letter of credit transaction).
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to comply with their undertaking absent that rare situation where they have
actual knowledge of the beneficiary's fraud.
To accomplish these tasks, this Article will trace the American
development of the fraud exception since its inception in 1941 until the
present date. This evaluation will establish that the fraud exception was
incorporated into the case law at a time when merchants in one location were
less knowledgeable about their counterparts in other locales and were unable
to fully avoid or protect themselves from the risks of fraudulent activities or
political upheavals. The inability to determine the credit worthiness or
commercial honesty of the parties to the underlying transaction was frustrated
by the lack of sophisticated communications systems and the lack of
sufficient financial information of the various parties. As this Article will
establish, the fraud exception was subsequently incorporated into the
Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter U.C.C.] 20 at a time when the primary
concerns were to protect banks and applicants from unscrupulous and
fraudulent beneficiaries, and the fraud exception was seen as a sufficient and
simple policing mechanism. For, without the fraud exception, the concern
was that the applicant would have to reimburse the issuer that honors its letter
of credit and then litigate the alleged fraudulent activity, most likely in a
distant and unfamiliar forum, against a beneficiary who had already been
paid. Of course, as will be shown in this Article, that is what the applicant
20The original U.C.C. was promulgated in the fall of 1951, but was enacted only in
Pennsylvania, and was subsequently revised in late 1956 and published as the 1957 Official Text.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT, Report No. 1 of the Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code vii (1962). In 1958, certain amendments were
made to Articles 8 and 9 and the U.C.C. was republished as the "1958 Official Text." Id. at viii.
Various states adopted the version, but as it become apparent that many states were making their
own amendments to the U.C.C. upon adoption, an effort to curb this tendency began, which
ultimately resulted in the 1962 Official Text. Id. at viii-x. Since 1962, various Articles ofthe U.C.C.
have been revised and even a new Article 4A dealing with Funds Transfers has been approved and
incorporated into the U.C.C. This Article's primary focus is on the U.C.C.'s treatment of letters of
credit found in Article 5. The original Article 5 was substantially revised for the first time in 1995
after having been approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Law Institute. See 2B UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) 125-35 (Master
ed. 2002) (noting that the original Article 5 had been drafted over 40 year ago and then giving a
brief history of the revision process and listing the dates of approval by the states of Revised Article
5). See also Revised Article §§ 5-101-5-117, 2B UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) 136-384
(Master ed. 2002). In this Article, the 1995 version of Article 5 will be referred to as Revised Article
5, while the original version of Article 5 will be referred to as Prior Article 5.
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bargained for in entering into the underlying contract with the beneficiary
that called for payment through a letter of credit. However, in today's world,
the diligent applicant should be able to make a truly educated determination
of the honesty, financial strength, and credibility of whomever he is entering
a contractual relationship with, and should be the one shouldering the
economic risks of fraud in the document presentation or in the underlying
transaction. Thus, injunctive relief should not be relied upon by the frustrated
applicant of the letter of credit. While in the past it has been all too simple to
rely on the maxim that fraud unravels all, it is time to expose the fallacy of
applying that maxim in the case of modern letters of credit transactions and
untether the independence principle from the fraud inquiry.21
The Article will start with a brief discussion of the nature of a letter of
credit transaction. This part of the Article will identify the various parties and
contractual relationships that are involved in a letter of credit transaction.
This Article will then discuss the two guiding principles of letters of credit
law-the independence principle and the requirement that the documents that
are presented under a letter of credit transaction must "strictly comply" with
the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. Then this Article will briefly
trace the history and development of the fraud exception in letters of credit
law and its incorporation into the U.C.C. The Article will then review four
recent cases involving the fraud exception. These cases present a common
theme that is illustrative of much of today's letter of credit fraud litigation.
Specifically, these cases involve applicants who failed to use their business
acumen and judgment to protect themselves when entering into an underlying
contractual arrangement and then sought the protection of the courts to
extricate themselves from a business deal that went awry. In each of the cases,
if the applicant had used due diligence, there would never have been a need
for judicial interference.
Finally, this Article will propose revising Revised Article 5-109 of the
U.C.C. to completely untether the independence principle by eliminating the
availability of injunctive, or any other, relief. This proposal is based in part
upon the assumption that sophisticated businessmen and entities who have
the means to insulate themselves from potential fraud should not expect
courts to bail them out of a contractual arrangement that goes sour. This
21See, e.g., United City Merch. v. Royal Bank of Can., I A.C. 168, 184 (House of Lords 1983)
(stating that "[t]he exception of fraud on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail himself of the
credit is a clear application of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio or, if plain English is to be
preferred, 'fraud unravels all.' The courts will not allow their process to be used by a dishonest
person to carry out the fraud").
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proposal is also based upon the fact that, in today's financial world, the
reputation of a financial institution is not tarnished by honoring a conforming
presentation even if it is subsequently determined that the beneficiary
committed fraud in either the documents or the underlying transaction.
Furthermore, such an honoring will not destroy the utility of letters of credit.
Letters of credit will still form the backbone of financing international
commercial transactions and securing performance by a party. If there truly
is fraud in the transaction or the documents, the applicant who let all of this
unfold in the first place through a lack of due diligence should bear the entire
economic ramifications of the failure of the transaction. The legal system
should remain out of the letter of credit transaction and let the original
contracting parties litigate whatever controversy they have between
themselves pursuant to the terms of their original underlying contract. Thus,
the issuer should be permitted to follow the untethered independence
principle based on its own good faith, and not be subject to any form of
litigation from the applicant or others seeking to prevent payment pursuant
to the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. Of course, in those limited
situations where the issuer has actual knowledge of fraud or forgery in the
documents that are presented, or of fraud in the underlying transaction, the
issuer alone should have the right in good faith to dishonor the presentation.
II. THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE LETIER OF CREDIT
Traditionally, letters of credit are classified as either commercial letters
of credit or standby letters of credit.22 Commercial letters of credit are the
backbone of the international sale of goods and are used to finance and pay
for the merchandise that is the subject of the underlying contract.23 Standby
letters of credit are used in a number of different types of transaction,
22See Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Effects of UCP 600 Upon UCC Article 5 with Respect to
Negotiation Credits and the Immunity of Negotiating Banks from Letter-of-Credit Fraud, 54
WAYNE L. REv. 735, 739 (2008).
23
See generally WHITE ET AL., 3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PRACTITIONER TREATISE
SERIES ¶26:2 162-64 (6th ed. 2014). It is important to note that the volume of world-wide seabom
trade has grown 4 percent in 2017 (the fastest increase in over 5 years with total volumes reaching
10.7 billion tons). See Review of Maritime Transport, 2018, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEv. x
(2018), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2018_en.pdf (projecting growth at 4% in
2018).
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typically not involving the sale of goods, and acts as a payment guarantee24
or security for the beneficiary in the case of the applicant's defective
performance or nonperformance of its contractual obligations arising from
the underlying contract.25 In a typical letter of credit transaction, there are
three primary parties-the applicant, the issuer, and the beneficiary.26 In
24 While the standby credit may act as a guarantee, it is not a guarantee as noted by a court in
the following language:
We first note that a standby letter of credit itself does not create a suretyship. A standby
letter of credit functions somewhat like a guaranty, given that it is the applicant's default
that triggers the beneficiary's ability to draw on the letter of credit. But a true letter of
credit arrangement is not a guaranty. First and foremost, the issuer's obligation to pay
upon presentation of conforming documents is a primary obligation, not a secondary one.
Although default may trigger a draw, it is only upon proper certification of the applicant's
default that the issuer is obligated to pay.
CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 669 F.3d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 2012)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
250ne commentator asserted that, if a letter of credit is not a commercial letter of credit, it is a
standby letter of credit. Dole, supra note 22, at 740 (following his brief description of a commercial
letter of credit, the author simply states that "[a]ll other letters of credit can be regarded as standbys"
(footnote omitted)). Another commentator notes, however, that there are significant differences
between the two types of letters of credit. First, the beneficiary of a standby letter of credit must
certify that his obligor has defaulted on his contractual obligations. In a commercial letter, the
beneficiary must present the required documents in order to receive payment for merchandise
shipped under a contract of sale. Secondly, the issuer of a commercial credit assumes that it will
pay the seller's drafts, whereas the issuer of the standby credit generally does not expect to pay.
Finally, the documents presented by the beneficiary in the commercial credit are generally always
the same, whereas the documents presented in a standby credit are generally unique to the
underlying transaction, which generally involves a number of non-sale situations. See John F.
Dolan, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY CREDITS ¶1.04, 1-15 to I-
17 (2d ed. 1991).
One court has explained the difference between the two letters of credit as follows:
Unlike a traditional commercial letter of credit, which is commonly used in commercial
sales to reduce the risk of nonpayment for goods, standby letters of credit are used in the
non-sale setting and serve to reduce the risk of nonperformance under a performance
contract. To draw on the letter, the beneficiary is typically required to produce documents
certifying the applicant has defaulted on its underlying obligation to the beneficiary.
CRM Collateral II, 669 F.3d at 969.
26The U.C.C. defines these three as follows:
(2) "Applicant" means a person at whose request or for whose account a letter of credit
is issued. The term includes a person who requests an issuer to issue a letter of credit on
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addition to these three main parties to a letter of credit transaction, other
parties could be involved-such as, advisors,27 confirmers,28 or a nominated
person.29
The three primary parties are loosely interrelated by three separate and
distinct contractual relationships. First, there is the underlying contract
between the applicant and the beneficiary that provides that payment will be
made through a letter of credit. The underlying contract will also specify that
the applicant will make an application with an issuer for the issuance of an
irrevocable letter of credit. Thus, under an underlying sales contract, the
applicant has an obligation to pay for the goods and the beneficiary agrees to
obtain payment by drawing drafts3 0 under a letter of credit to be procured
behalf of another if the person making the request undertakes an obligation to reimburse
the issuer.
(3) "Beneficiary" means a person who under the terms of a letter of credit is entitled to
have its complying presentation honored. The term includes a person to whom drawing
rights have been transferred under a transferable letter of credit.
(9) "Issuer" means a bank or other person that issues a letter of credit, but does not include
an individual who makes an engagement for personal, family, or household purposes.
U.C.C. § 5-102(2), (3), & (9).
27The U.C.C. defines an advisor as follows: 'Adviser' means a person who, at the request of
the issuer, a confirmer, or another adviser, notifies or requests another adviser to notify the
beneficiary that a letter of credit has been issued, confirmed, or amended." Id. § 5-102(1).
28The U.C.C. defines a confirmer as follows: "'Confirmer' means a nominated person who
undertakes, at the request or with the consent of the issuer, to honor a presentation under a letter of
credit issued by another." Id. § 5-102(4).
29The U.C.C. defines a "nominated person" as follows:
"Nominated person" means a person whom the issuer:
(i) designates or authorizes to pay, accept, negotiate, or otherwise give value under a
letter of credit; and
(ii) undertakes by agreement or custom and practice to reimburse.
Id. § 5-102(1 1).
30Article 3 of the U.C.C. deals with negotiable instruments. Revised Article §§ 3-101-3-605,
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) 23-354 (Master ed. 2004) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.
§ 3 Section Number]. A "draft" is an order to pay money. U.C.C. § 3-104(a), (e). A "drawer" is the
person ordering payment who signs the draft. Id. § 3-103(a)(5). The "drawee" is the person ordered
to pay the draft. Id. § 3-103(aX4). A draft in negotiable form is an order to pay money that is subject
to the provisions of the U.C.C. dealing with negotiable instruments. Id. § 3-102(a). In a letter of
credit transaction, the draft utilized in conjunction with the transaction is typically drawn by the
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from an issuer by the applicant.31 The applicant and the issuer would enter
into the second contract (generally referred to as a reimbursement contract32
under which the bank agrees to issue an irrevocable letter of credit in favor
of the beneficiary and the applicant agrees to reimburse the bank when, and
if, it honors33 a presentation under the letter of credit by payment. Pursuant
to the terms of this second contract, the issuer is obliged to go forward with
issuing the letter of credit with the terms and conditions requested by the
applicant.34 The issuing bank can inform the beneficiary directly of the
issuance letter of credit and its terms.
The third contractual relationship is the letter of credit itself. The issuer
accepts the reimbursement contract by issuing the letter of credit, which is
the bank's irrevocable undertaking3 6 to perform its obligations pursuant to
beneficiary as drawer, upon the issuer or a confirmer as drawee, and may or may not be in negotiable
form and therefore subject to Article 3. See id. § 5-102, cmt. 11 ("[A] document may be a draft
under Article 5 even though it would not be a negotiable instrument [under Article 3]."). It should
be noted that, in the event ofa conflict between Article 3 and Article 5, Article 5 governs. See id.
§ 5-116(d).
3 The comments to Article 5-102 state the obvious: that this contract is not governed by Article
5 of the U.C.C., but by either Article 2 of the U.C.C., if the contract involves the sale of goods, or
otherwise by the general law of contracts. See U.C.C. § 5-102, cmt. 3.
32See id. (stating that the contract between the applicant and the issuer is sometimes called the
reimbursement agreement"). See also id. § 5-108(i)(1) (noting that an issuer that honored a
presentation is entitled to be reimbursed by the applicant).
"Id. § 5-102(8) defines "honor" for purposes of Revised Article 5 as follows:
"Honor" of a letter of credit means performance of the issuer's undertaking in the letter
of credit to pay or deliver an item of value. Unless the letter of credit otherwise provides,
"honor" occurs:
(i) upon payment;
(ii) if the letter of credit provides for acceptance, upon acceptance of a draft and,
at maturity, its payment; or
(iii) if the letter of credit provides for incurring a deferred obligation, upon
incurring the obligation and, at maturity, its performance.
Id. § 5-102(8).
'See id. § 5-102, cmt. 3 (stating that this contract is governed in part by Revised Article 5 and
partly by the general law of contracts).
"See id. § 5-106(a) (providing that the letter of credit "is issued and becomes enforceable
against the issuer" when the letter is sent or transmitted to an adviser or the beneficiary).
36The U.C.C. defines a "letter of credit" as follows:
"Letter of credit" means a definite undertaking that satisfies the requirements of Section
5-104 by an issuer to a beneficiary at the request or for the account of an applicant or, in
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the terms and conditions of the credit. The letter of credit unconditionally
obligates the bank to honor a presentation of a draft or demand for payment
that is tendered by the beneficiary along with whatever other documents the
letter of credit may require be presented. In the case of a commercial letter of
credit, these documents relate to the seller's performance of the underlying
sales transaction and may generally include the seller's demand for payment
or draft, seller's commercial invoice, and shipping documents (most likely a
bill of lading37) that reflect that the goods have been shipped.3 8 A standby
the case of a financial institution, to itself or for its own account, to honor a documentary
presentation by payment or delivery of an item of value.
Id. § 5-102(10).
U.C.C. § 5-104 states: "A letter of credit, confirmation, advice, transfer, amendment, or
cancellation may be issued in any form that is a record and is authenticated (i) by a signature or
(ii) in accordance with the agreement of the parties or the standard practice referred to in Section 5 -
108(e)." Id. § 5-104.
U.C.C. § 5-108(e) states: "An issuer shall observe standard practice of financial institutions
that regularly issue letters of credit. Determination of the issuer's observance of the standard practice
is a matter of interpretation for the court. The court shall offer the parties a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence of the standard practice." Id. § 5-108(e).
See also id. § 5-101, Official Comment (describing a "letter of credit as an idiosyncratic form
of undertaking that supports performance of an obligation incurred in a separate financial,
mercantile, or other transaction or arrangement").
37Article 1, Part 2 of the U.C.C. deals with General Definitions and Principles of Interpretation.
See Revised Article §§ 1-201-1-206, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) 23-56 (Master ed.
2012) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C. § I Section Number]. One of the definitions provided in Article
1, Part 2 is for the term "bill of lading." It is defined as: "'Bill of lading' means a document
evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of
transporting or forwarding goods." U.C.C. § 1-201 (6). A bill of lading is a document of title and
provisions in Article 7 of the U.C.C. specifically apply to bills of lading. See Revised Article §§ 7-
301 to 7-603, 2C UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) 120-191 (Master ed. 2005) [hereinafter
cited as U.C.C. § 7 Section Number]. Bills of lading play a key role in international trade because
such trade is usually carried out using a bill of lading. See INDIRA CARR, INT'L TRADE L. 229 (4th
ed. 2010).
3
8See, e.g., United Commodities-Greece v. Fid. Int'l Bank, 478 N.E.2d 172, 173-74 (N.Y.
1985) (requiring presentation of "a warehouse or dock receipt issued to the order accompanied by
a bank guarantee that beneficiary will load the goods on first demand of orderer and remit to the
negotiating bank, free of charges, the covering Bill of Lading"); Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking
Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (N.Y. Special Term 1941) (requiring presentation of a draft, invoice,
and bill of lading covering the shipment). Other documents can be required pursuant to the terms
and conditions of the letter of credit, such as an inspection certificate by an independent testing
agency to assure the buyer that the seller has performed his contractual obligations concerning the
conformity of the goods. See, e.g., ACR Sys., Inc. v. Woori Bank, 232 F. Supp. 3d 471, 474
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letter of credit, like the commercial letter of credit, calls for payment against
the presentation of specified documents and is frequently used to assure
payment to the beneficiary upon contractual default by the applicant. 3
Typically, in the case of a standby letter, the only documents necessary for
presentation by the beneficiary are a sight draft or demand for payment and/or
a signed certificate or letter stating or certifying that the applicant has not
performed under the terms of the underlying contract between the applicant
and the beneficiary.4 In either case, the beneficiary is assured of payment
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (requiring not only a bill of lading and the commercial invoice, but also an
inspection certificate from the person receiving the goods for shipping).
39A listing of cases involving standby letters of credit establish that they are used in various
situations and act as guarantees in those cases where the applicants default on their contractual
obligations. See, e.g., Mago Int'l v. LHB AG, 833 F.3d 270, 271 (2d Cir. 2016) (involving a standby
letter of credit to be drawn upon failure of the buyer to timely pay invoices for the purchase of meat
products); Langley v. Prudential Mortg. Capital Co., 546 F.3d 365, 367 (6th Cir. 2008), reh'g
denied, 554 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2009) (using a standby letter of credit to secure a rate lock deposit
for a substantial loan to purchase and develop real estate); Great Wall de Venezuela C.A. v. Interaudi
Bank, 117 F. Supp. 3d 474, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (involving a letter of credit covering three
installments for the purchase of company shares and an automobile assembly plant in Venezuela);
Hook Point, LLC v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 725 S.E.2d 681,682 (S.C. 2012) (using ofa standby
letter of credit in the case a real estate developer failed to perform its obligations under a
development loan); Ladenburg Thalmann & Co. v. Signature Bank, 6 N.Y.S.3d 33, 34 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2015) (securing a subtenant's payment of rent by the use of a standby letter of credit); Lennar
Homes, L.L.C. v. Ventures, LLC, 988 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. D.C. App. 2008) (securing a seller of
real estate by means of a standby letter of credit payable in the event the buyer defaulted in the
purchase). See also JAMES G. BARNES ET AL., THE ABCS OF THE UCC: ARTICLE 5: LETTERS OF
CR-EDIT 8-9 (1998) (listing various ways that standby letters of credit have been used).
"See, e.g., 3M Co. v. HSBC Bank U.S.A., N.A., 16 Civ. 5984 (PGG), 2018 WL 1989563, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2018) (involving a standby letter of credit requiring only a demand for
payment and a written statement hat the immediate beneficiary had received a demand for payment
under second letter of credit in accordance with that letter of credit's terms); Hook Point, 725 S.E.2d
at 682 (involving a standby letter of credit that the beneficiary was permitted to make draws against
upon presentation of drafts and a notarized sworn statement that the applicant had failed to perform
its obligations).
Standby letters of credit are often used in construction contracts in foreign countries by and
between an American Contractor and an entity that is owned or controlled by the government (or a
governmental agency) of the foreign country where the project is to be done. In those situations,
there is generally a requirement in the underlying construction contract that a local bank in the
foreign country issue a performance guarantee or bond to ensure the American contractor performs
its work according to the terms ofthe contract. The bank issuing the performance guarantee typically
requires that a standby letter of credit be issued on the applicant's bank that is payable upon a
payment demand and a letter stating that there was a call on the foreign bank to pay under its
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upon proper presentation of the documents, and the applicant is assured that
the beneficiary's presentation will not be honored until the proper
documentation is presented to the issuer. If the documents comply, the issuer
honors the draft or demand for payment generally by immediately paying the
beneficiary. In the case of a commercial letter of credit, the beneficiary will
typically endorse the negotiable bill of lading to the order of the issuer as
additional security for the payment made to the beneficiary.41 Thus, in the
performance bond or guarantee. For example, in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 0988 (JSR), 2011 WL 855936, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011), the letter of
credit issued by JP Morgan stated in part that: "[Funds are] ... available against your authenticated
Swift/Tested Telex that you have duly issued your Performance Bond as requested by ourselves and
that you have received a claim in accordance with the terms of the performance bond."
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a fruitful source of litigation in standby letters of credit.
Like many of the construction contracts that form a major portion of standby letters of credit, there
were typically four parties involved in the cases that arose: an American company, an Iranian
governmental agent, an Iranian bank, and a United States Bank. The performance of the contract
between the American company and the Iranian governmental agency was guaranteed by a
performance bond or guarantee issued by an Iranian Bank. These performance bonds or guarantees
were securitized with a letter of credit issued by an American bank. After the Iranian Revolution,
fearing fraudulent calls on the Iranian bank's performance bond or guarantees and then calls to
honor the letter of credit, American companies flocked to the courts to seek protection. Most of the
requests for injunctive relief were denied before the taking of the hostage at the U.S. Embassy in
Teheran in November of 1979, while in the post-hostage cases, a majority of the injunctions were
granted. See, e.g., Mark P. Zimmett, Standby Letters of Credit in the Iran Litigation: Two Hundred
Problems in Search of a Solution, 16 L. & PUB. POL'Y INT'L Bus. 927, 930, 943 (noting only
marginal success prior to the hostage crisis, whereas, out of 14 post hostage cases filed in district
court, 12 were granted). Compare Am. Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420,
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (denying pre-hostage injunctive relief by simply noting that both Bell (the
applicant) and the issuing American bank were innocent parties, but "as between two innocents, the
party who undertakes by contract the risk of political uncertainty and governmental caprice must
bear the consequences when the risk comes home to roost"), with Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio
& Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1356 (11th Cir. 1982) (granting, in a post-hostage case, injunctive
relief on grounds that "NIRT's [beneficiary] demand was made in a situation that was subtly
suggestive of fraud since NIRT and Bank Melli (the Iranian Bank that had issued the performance
guarantee) had both become government enterprises, the demand was in some sense by Iran upon
itself and may have been an effort by Iran to harvest undeserved bounty from Continental Bank (the
issuer)"). Given the change in attitude toward granting injunctive relief in the post-hostage situation,
one commentator suggested that the change in attitude may have been "influenced by the
widespread sentiment that Iran should be punished." See Zimmett, supra, at 946.
4
1See, e.g., Xiang Gao, The Fraud Rule Under the UN Convention on Independent Guarantees
and Standby Letters of Credit: A Significant Contribution from an International Perspective, 1 GEO.
MASON J. INT'L COM. L. 48, 51 (2010) (stating that, upon paying the seller, the bank acquires a
security over the documents to secure the advance made financing the transaction); Buckley & Gao,
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typical commercial letter of credit transaction, the seller is the beneficiary of
the credit, while in a traditional standby letter of credit, the party who entered
into the underlying contract with the applicant is the beneficiary.42
In either case, the purpose of the letter of credit is to accomplish a shifting
of risks and the costs associated with those risks from one party to the other
party.43 In the commercial sales transaction, if there were no letter of credit
or other assurance for performance, such as a guarantee or performance bond,
the seller carries the risk of not getting paid after it has manufactured or
acquired the merchandise to be sold and shipped it the purchaser.
Furthermore, the seller will have to litigate the breach of contract in a
possibly distant or foreign forum without the funds for the sale. If, however,
a letter of credit is involved, the seller could get paid upon shipping and
supra note 4, at 666-67 (2002) (noting that the agreement between the applicant and the issuer will
provide that the merchandise will be additional security for the issuer's honor of the presentation).
42 it should be noted that even in a commercial sales transaction, the parties can use a standby
letter of credit to ensure that the seller gets paid after delivering on an open account and its invoices
are unpaid. See, e.g., Mago, 833 F.3d at 271 (using a standby letter of credit to ensure that the seller
got paid in the event the buyer did not timely pay the invoices for sale of chickens).
43One well-known commercial law commentator explained the risks associated with a letter of
credit in the following words:
Under letter of credit practice and law, the applicant bears the risk of disputes regarding
the performance of the underlying transactions that gave rise to the letter of credit. In
effect, the letter of credit represents an allocation of the risk of who holds funds pending
the resolution of these disputes. In the ordinary case under a letter of credit, the
beneficiary is entitled to hold the funds until things can be sorted out. Although payment
to the beneficiary is final with respect to the letter of credit obligation, the obligation that
gave rise to it remains and may be a basis for recovery by the applicant to the credit or
any assignee of its rights in a post-payment action against the beneficiary on the
underlying transaction. The abstract status of the beneficiary, therefore, can be
understood as temporary or interim. That of the LC issuer or nominated bank is
permanent. The rule protects these banks, as it should, if the system is to have currency,
since where these banks, as intermediaries, have in good faith paid funds to the fraudster
pursuant to their undertaking or nomination, they ought to be able to obtain
reimbursement. Assuming that lending or credit decisions were sound, the loss will be
thrown onto the applicant who either elected to deal with the beneficiary or used its credit
to obtain the LC for the person who did so.
James E. Byrne, Negotiation in Letter of Credit Practice and Law: The Evolution of the Doctrine,
42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 561, 580-81 (2007) (footnote omitted). See also Mautner, supra note 17, at 596
(1986) (explaining that the independence rule does not conclusively establish the rights and duties
of the parties, but merely allocates the roles of plaintiff and defendant between them).
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before the buyer gets the goods by presenting the required documents." Thus,
the risks and costs associated with those risks are shifted to the buyer who
now must reimburse the issuer following its honor of the presentation and
pursue the seller for breach of contract in a possibly distant or foreign
forum.45 A transaction associated with a standby letter of credit works in a
similar manner to shift risks and the costs associated with those risks. For
example, when a contractor enters into a contract with a developer to build a
warehouse in a foreign country and does not provide a letter of credit or a
performance bond from a surety company and fails to perform, the developer
must employ another contractor to do the work at his own cost. He can also
seek his remedies under the contract through litigation in a possibly distant
or foreign forum on his own dollar. If, however, the contractor was obligated
to get a letter of credit, the developer could obtain funds to finish the project
"The advantages for the beneficiary in a commercial letter of credit transaction was succinctly
stated by a Texas court in the following language:
Contracting parties may use a letter of credit in order to "make certain that contract
disputes [between the applicant and beneficiary] wend their way towards resolution with
money in the beneficiary's pocket rather than in the pocket of the [applicant]." The
beneficiary's immediate right of possession of the funds on payment of the letter of credit
does not decide the dispute over who will ultimately retain those funds. "Without this
rule, the beneficiary of the letter of credit would be the ultimate arbiter of compliance
with the underlying contract and the commercial viability of the letter of credit would be
destroyed." Thus, the letter of credit determines the beneficiary's right to immediate
possession of the funds on presentation of conforming documents to the issuer, but not
the right to ultimately retain those funds.
Sava Gumarska in Kemijska Insustria D.D. v. Advanced Polymer Sci., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 304, 319
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.) (citing CKB & Assocs., Inc. v. Moore McCormack Petroleum,
Inc., 734 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex. 1978)) (emphasis added).
45See, e.g., CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metro. Transp. Dist., 669 F.3d 963, 969 (9th
Cir. 2012) (describing the typical letter of credit arrangement, including the reimbursement contract
between the applicant and the issuer, obligating the applicant to reimburse the issuer when payments
are made under the terms of the letter of credit). The issuer, of course, has certain risks that it must
address. First, the issuer takes the risk of the applicant's insolvency. Thus, the issuer needs to
evaluate the applicant's credit worthiness and financial capabilities before agreeing to issue the
letter of credit. See generally BARNES ET AL., supra note 39, at 2-3 (stating that the buyer is not out
any up-front funds for the purchase of the merchandise, and only becomes obligated to reimburse
the bank when it honors its letter of credit). In many situations, the issuer will require that the
applicant provide collateral to secure the obligation to reimburse. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff'd 395 F. App'x 583 (1 Ith Cir. 2010) (stating
that the beneficiary mortgaged some of his property to guarantee the issuer's letter of credit).
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by the presentation of a draft and a written statement certifying that the
applicant had failed to perform its contracted obligations.4 6 If the contractor
believes that the developer wrongfully drew on the letter of credit, the
contractor would have to pursue the developer in a possibly distant or foreign
forum on its own dollar. Thus, the risks and many of the costs are shifted
from the developer to the contractor. Thus, while the letter of credit does not
allocate the ultimate loss between the parties to the underlying transaction, it
shifts the risks and the costs associated with those risks between the parties.
After the issuer has honored a presentation, the buyer who has received
defective merchandise (commercial letter of credit) or alleges that he did not
breach the underlying contract (standby letter of credit) is free to sue the other
party to recover his losses. As we will see in the next section, the
"independence" principle prevents the issuer from raising the
buyer's/contractor's defenses to the underlying sales contract or other
contractual arrangement, but that principle does not foreclose suit on those
claims by the buyer/contractor after payment under the credit.
III. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF LETTERS OF CREDIT LAW: THE
INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF STRICT
COMPLIANCE
The cornerstone of letters of credit law is the independence principle-that
is, that the three contractual arrangements described above are not dependent
upon each other but are totally independent from each other.47 Each of these
'See, e.g., Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. Gov't of Israel, 670 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1982) (requiring
only a sight draft and Israel's own "certification that it is entitled to the amount covered by such
draft by reason of a clear and substantial breach" of the construction contract). See also Ace Am.
Ins. Co. v. Bank ofOzarks, No. 11 Civ. 3146 (PGG), No. 11 Civ. 3146 (PGG), 2014 WL4953566,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (requiring only a sight draft containing a reference that it was
drawn under the specific letter of credit).
4 7The underlying principle of the letters of credit law is the independence of the three separate
and distinct arrangements among the parties. See, e.g., Compass Bank v. Morris Cerullo World
Evangelism, 699 F. App'x 184, 186-87 (9th Cir. 2017) (referring to the fact that the issuer's
obligation under the letter of credit was independent of other contracts); Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
395 F. App'x 583, 591 (1 Ith Cir. 2010) (stating that the well-established principle is that the issuer's
obligation to the beneficiary is independent of any party's performance under the underlying
contract); In re Onecast Media, Inc., 439 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that each of the three
arrangements involved in a letter of credit situation "must be treated separately"); Alaska Textile
Co. Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 815 (2nd Cir. 1992) (asserting that the three
relationships are "utterly independent of each other," giving great utility to the letter of credit);
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three relationships is considered separate and distinct in its operation and
performance.48 The independence principle is principally incorporated into
the Revised U.C.C. in the following language:
Voest-Alpine Trading Co. v. Bank of China, 167 F. Supp. 2d 940, 944 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (stating
that "[t]he underlying principle of the letter of credit transaction is the independence of the three
contracts" (citing Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 1983)));
Benecke v. Haebler, 58 N.Y.S. 16, 17-18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1899), aff'd 60 N.E. 1107 (N.Y. 1901)
(holding that the issuer had no duty to "ascertain, before accepting, whether the goods shipped
corresponded in quality to the goods ordered"). See also Rufus James Trimble, The Law ofMerchant
and the Letter of Credit, 61 HARv. L. REV. 981, 1006 (1948) (stating that "[i]t is inherent in the
nature of a letter of credit that neither the contractual relationship between the issuer and its
customer, nor that between the customer and beneficiary is relevant to the question of the
enforceability of the letter" (citations omitted)).
As one commentator noted:
Revised Article 5 clearly and forcefully states the independence of the letter of credit
obligations from the underlying transaction that was unexpressed in, but was a
fundamental predicate for, the original Article 5 (Sections 5-103(d) and 5-108(f)).
Certainty of payment, independent of other claims, setoffs or other cause of action, is a
core element of the commercial utility of letters of credit.
BURTON V. MCCULLOUGH, LETTERS OF CREDIT: 1995 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: REVISED
ARTICLE 5 WITH ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 11 (1996).
4 8The independence of these three relationships was succinctly stated as follows:
Each of the three transactions involved in letter of credit financing are separate and
independent from the others. The duties of the obligor and obligee under the underlying
contract are not affected by a bank's agreement to furnish a letter of credit and are not
affected by issuance of the letter itself. The Bank's duty to its customer to issue the letter
of credit is not affected by the existence or performance of the underlying contract. The
Bank's commitment to honor its letter, once issued, is not affected by its customer's
failure to provide consideration for issuance of the letter or by the beneficiary's failure to
perform its obligations under the underlying contract. The purpose of this independence
is to guarantee an obligee of the underlying contract (in this case, Israel Discount Bank
of New York) that it will be paid and to shift all risks of non-payment from such obligee
to a bank (in this case to the Mercantile National Bank) which is better able than the
obligee to analyze the obligor's financial stability and protect itself in the event of the
obligor's default.
In re Originala Petr. Corp., 39 BR. 1003, 1007 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984). See also Bank of Nova
Scotia v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd., 36 D.L.R.4th 161, 166 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1987) (asserting that
"[tihe fundamental principle governing documentary letters of credit and the characteristic which
gives them their international commercial utility and efficacy is that the obligation of the issuing
bank to honour a draft on a credit when it is accompanied by documents which appear on their face
to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit is independent of the performance of
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Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary or a
nominated person under a letter of credit are independent of
the existence, performance, or nonperformance of a contract
or arrangement out of which the letter of credit arises, or
which underlies it, including contracts or arrangements
between the issuer and the applicant and between the
applicant and the beneficiary.4 9
the underlying contract for which the credit was issued"); Alaska, 982 F.2d at 815 (stating that the
"principle infuses the transaction with the simplicity and certainty that are its hallmarks"); Marino
Ind. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 686 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that "[i]t is
the complete separation between the underlying commercial transaction and the letter of credit that
gives the letter its utility in financing transactions"); United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods
Corp., 360 N.E.2d 943, 948 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that issuers deal in documents, not goods, and have
no responsibility for performance of the underlying contract).
The. independence principle has been part of commercial letter of credit law since the middle
of the nineteenth century. See HENRY HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 158-62 (4th
ed. 1974) (reproducing Karl Llewellyn's Commentary on the development of the commercial letter
of credit in the middle of the nineteenth century). See generally Boris Kozolchyk, The Legal Nature
of the Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 395, 398 (1965) (stating that,
after the middle of nineteenth century, the commercial letter of credit gained favor with merchants
in the United States and Europe).
49 U.C.C. § 5-103(d). Other sections of Article 5 also impact the application of the
independence principle. See id. § 5-108(a) (requiring that the documents presented for payment
must strictly comply with the terms of the credit); id. § 5-108(f) (stating that the issuer has no
responsibility for performance of the underlying contract); id. § 5-102(a)(10) (defining a letter of
credit as an undertaking to honor a documentary presentation); id. § 5-109 (authorizing honor by
the issuer in good faith even in the face of claims of fraud). See also id. § 5-102, cmt. 3 (articulating
the relationship between the good faith requirement and the independence principle); id. § 5-103,
cmt. 1 (differentiating letters of credit from guarantees on the availability of defenses asserted on
underlying contracts).
The independence principle was not directly mentioned in the Prior U.C.C., but that document
provided that the issuer's obligation to its customer did not include liability or responsibility "for
performance of the underlying contract for sale or other transition between the customer and the
beneficiary." Prior Art. 5-109 (1)(a), 2B, Part 2, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) 109
(Master ed. 2004) [hereinafter references to the Prior U.C.C. Article 5 will be cited as Prior U.C.C.
§ 5 Section Number]. The Official Comment to Prior U.C.C. Section 5-109 fleshed out this
provision as follows:
Paragraph (a) rests on the assumptions that the issuer has had no control over the making
of the underlying contract or over the selection of the beneficiary, and that the issuer
receives compensation for a payment service rather than for a guaranty of performance.
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An Official Comment to U.C.C. Section 5-103 explains the drafter's intent
of this Section as follows:
In letter of credit law, on the other hand, the independence
principle recognized throughout Article 5 states that the
issuer's liability is independent of the underlying obligation.
That the beneficiary may have breached the underlying
contract and thus have given a good defense on that contract
to the applicant against the beneficiary is no defense for the
issuer's refusal to honor. Only staunch recognition of this
principle by the issuers and the courts will give letters of
credit the continuing vitality that arises from the certainty
and speed of payment under letters of credit. To that end, it
is important that the law not carry into letter of credit
transactions rules that properly apply only to secondary
guarantees or to other forms of engagement.o
The customer will normally have direct recourse against the beneficiary if performance
fails ....
Prior U.C.C. § 5-109, cmt. 1.
soU.C.C. § 5-103, cmt. I (emphasis added). Although, the letter of credit functions like a
guaranty, there are two major differences between the letter of credit arrangement and the standard
guaranty. See id. (noting that guarantees are undertakings typically "used to describe a suretyship
relationship in which the 'guarantor' is only secondarily liable and has the right to assert the
underlying debtor's defenses"). However, the issuer of a letter of credit is unconditionally liable to
the beneficiary and cannot set up defenses that the applicant might raises against the beneficiary.
See also David J. Barru, How to Guarantee Contractor Performance on International Construction
Projects: Comparing Surety Bonds with Bank Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit, 37 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 51, 66 (2005) (noting that a guarantor is liable only if the principal obligor
defaults); Border Nat'l Bank v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1922) (stating that a
"guaranty is a promise to answer for the payment of some debt, or the performance of some
obligation, in case of default of another person, who is in the first instance liable for such payment
or performance").
The distinctions between the two were succinctly stated in Mr. Harfield's leading text:
A proper letter of credit is an independent contract that states all of the conditions
defining the rights and obligations of the parties. A dispute as to those rights or
obligations must be resolved by reference only to the letter of credit and not to any other
contact or relationship. A guaranty is a contact that is ancillary to some other contract or
relationship, so that a dispute as to the rights or obligations of parties to the contract of
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Issuers are obliged to honor draws under letters of credit that meet the
documentary requirements of the letter even if the applicant has a complaint
about the beneficiary's performance. Assume, for example, that a seller had
a contract to deliver certain merchandise to a buyer, but the merchandise
delivered did not conform to the terms of the sales contract. The buyer's
cause of action for breach of warranty does not give the issuer-who is
unconditionally obligated to pay on seller's presentation of an invoice, a bill
of lading and, perhaps, other documents-the right to refuse payment when
the required documents are presented. The issuer's legal obligation-to pay
on the documents alone-is the application of the independence principle.
Issuers must honor a presentation and pay a beneficiary who presents
conforming documents even if the issuer's applicant has a right to recover
the money paid to the beneficiary in a subsequent suit for breach of
warranty."
guaranty can only be resolved by determination of the rights and obligations of parties to
the principal contract or relationship.
HARFIELD, supra note 48, at 163-64.
" U.C.C. § 5-110 states:
(a) If its presentation is honored, the beneficiary warrants:
(1) to the issuer, any other person to whom presentation is made, and the applicant
that there is no fraud or forgery of the kind described in Section 5-109(a); and
(2) to the applicant that the drawing does not violate any agreement between the
applicant and beneficiary or any other agreement intended by them to be augmented
by the letter of credit.
(b) The warranties in subsection (a) are in addition to warranties arising under Articles 3,
4, 7, and 8 because of the presentation or transfer of documents covered by any of those
articles.
U.C.C. § 5-110.
The applicant in a commercial letter of credit will most likely always have a direct action
against the beneficiary for breach of the underlying contract in cases where the beneficiary has not
performed acts necessary to be entitled to an honor of its presentation. See, e.g., Alhadeff v.
Meridian on Bainbridge Island, LLC, 220 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Wash. 2009) (citing U.C.C. § 5-110,
cmt. 2). The Official Comment to Section 5-110 notes that the warranty under U.C.C. Section 5-
11 0(a)(2) typically applies to standby letters of credit or in those situations where the applicant and
the beneficiary are not in a contractual relationship. See, e.g., id. at 1222 (noting when there is no
contract between the applicant and the beneficiary, there can be no breach of contract claim arising
from the underlying transaction, but that the warranties of U.C.C. § 5-110 are available).
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The second lynchpin of letters of credit law relates to the extent of
compliance of the documents presented to the issuer, obligating it to honor
such presentation. The Prior U.C.C. imposed an obligation on the issuer to
examine the documents to determine whether they were facially compliant
with the terms of the letter of credit.52 If the "documents appear on their face
to comply with the terms of the credit," the issuer generally had the duty to
honor a presentation.53 The Task Force established to make recommendations
for changes to the U.C.C. was critical of these sections primarily because
there was no guidance as to the standard of facial compliance.54 The provision
dealing with the compliance of the documents now states that the "issuer shall
honor a presentation that, as determined by the standard practice referred to
in subsection (e), appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and
conditions of the letter of credit."5 5 It is important to understand that this strict
compliance standard not only applies to the documents that are presented, but
also to other terms of the letter of credit, such as time and place for
presentation.56 An Official Comment to this section not only rejects the
"substantial compliance" standard that some courts had applied in
interpreting the Prior U.C.C. provisions,57 but also notes that "[s]trict
compliance does not mean slavish conformity to the terms of the letter of
52See Prior U.C.C. § 5-109(2).
s"See Prior U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (noting several exceptions, including a forged or fraudulent
document or fraud in the transaction).
'See The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5
(Letters of Credit), 45 BUS. L. 1521, 1586, 1608-10 (1990) (identifying the two major competing
standards used by the courts as "strict compliance" and "substantial compliance"). Section V of this
Article describes the work of the Task Force. See also Prior U.C.C. § 5-109, cmt. 2 (noting that the
purpose of the obligation to examine documents was "to determine whether the documents appear
regular on their face").
5 5U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (emphasis added). Subsection (e) requires the issuer to "observe standard
practice of financial institution that regularly issue letters of credit." Id.
5 1d. § 5-108, cmt. 1.
"The Official Comment I to U.C.C. § 5-108 cites two cases that the Code drafters believed
applied the substantial compliance standard. Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co.,
385 F.2d 230, 237 (1st Cir. 1967) (holding "that the inspection certificate in this case conformed in
all significant respects to the requirements of the letter of credit" (emphasis added)); Flagship
Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merch. Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 705 (1st Cir. 1978) (stating that
there was no fatal variance between documents presented and those required by the credit where the
issuer would not be misled to its detriment).
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credit."5 8 In spite of the Revised U.C.C. provision, compliance disputes
concerning the presentation of documents continue to be a significant
litigation problem.59 During the drafting of the letter of credit, the applicant
5 U.C.C. § 5-108, cmt. 1 (citing cases establishing that "strict compliance" means less than
absolute and perfect compliance). The Comment cited New Braunfels Bank v. Odiorne, 780 S.W.2d
313, 318 (Tex. App.-1989, writ denied), where the court held that a draft that was presented,
referencing credit 86-122-5, was in compliance with the credit that was number 86-122-S. Id.
(emphasis added). The second case the Comment approved was Tosco Corp. v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp.,
723 F.2d 1242 (6th Cir. 1983). In that case, payment was authorized even though the drafts
presented stated "No." instead of Number, used a lower-case "I" instead of a capital "L" in reference
to the credit itself, and inserted the state where the bank was located although that was not required
in the letter of credit itself. Id. at 1247. More recently, a New York court stated that a court's role
in applying the strict compliance rule was merely ministerial, and asserted that to "require [the
issuer] to determine the substantiality of the discrepancy would be inconsistent with its function."
See Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc. v. Signature Bank, 6 N.Y.S.3d 33, 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)
(citing United Commodities-Greece v. Fid. Int'l Bank, 478 N.E.2d 172, 174 (N.Y. 1985)). In the
Ladenburg case, the letter of credit required the presentment of the original of the letter of credit
and all amendments. 1d. at 38. However, the actual presentation included only a copy of one of the
amendments, which had subsequently been superseded. In holding that the presentation was in
substantial compliance, the court stated:
In the matter before us, there is no possibility that the presentation of a true copy of
amendment 2, instead of the original, could mislead defendant to its detriment. Indeed,
this copy had been prepared by defendant itself, and was provided to plaintiff by
defendant's own attorney. Its accuracy was not in dispute, and there is no dispute
regarding the content of the document, which merely extended the expiration date of
amendment 2 and which had since been superseded by subsequent amendments. Since
the submission of a true copy of amendment 2 would not compel any inquiry by the bank
into the underlying transaction, the rationale for the strict compliance rule, "to protect the
issuer from having to know the commercial impact of a discrepancy in the documents,"
has no applicability here.
Id. at 38-39 (internal citation omitted). But see Arch Specialty Ins. Co. v. First Cmty. Bank of E.
Ark., No. 3:15-CV-223-DPM, 2016 WL 4473438, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 23, 2016) (noting that
presentation of a non-bank verified copy of the letter of credit, when the letter required an original,
was not in strict compliance).
59See, e.g., Mago Int'l v. LHB AG, 833 F.3d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 2016) (presenting an unsigned
bill of lading, where the letter of credit required a bill of lading that "[e]videncing shipment of the
goods to the applicant" was held not to strictly comply). The Court of Appeals for New York
stressed strict compliance in the following language:
We have long adhered to the principle that letters of credit must be strictly construed and
performed in compliance with their stated terms. The reason for this rule is rooted in the
very purpose of a letter of credit: "[b]y conditioning payment solely upon the terms set
forth in the letter of credit, the justifications for an issuing bank's refusal to honor the
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needs to ensure that that the letter of credit specifically lists the documents
that need to be presented, what each document needs to recite, and what sort
of presentation is required (written, electronic, or otherwise). It is important
to note that the issuer receives of minimal feeo for its issuance of the letter
of credit and it commits only to the ministerial function of quickly confirming
whether the presented documents comply with the terms and conditions of
the letter of credit.6 1
IV. THE FRAUD EXCEPTION TO THE INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE
As noted in the Introduction, a New York court in the Sztejn case in 1941
judicially introduced the fraud exception into Anglo-American jurisprudence
to the then well-recognized independence principle. In Sztejn, applying New
York law on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the
court deemed all the allegations of the plaintiff in the complaint as
credit are severely restricted, thereby assuring the reliability of letters of credit as a
payment mechanism." Thus, to make an issuing bank's payment obligation conditional,
the parties must clearly and explicitly set forth that requirement on the face of the letter
of credit.
Nissho lwai Europe PLC v. Korea First Bank, 782 N.E.2d 55, 59-60 (NY. 2002) (citations omitted).
See generally WHITE ET AL., supra note 23, at ¶¶26:23-26.30, 212-29 (identifying the various court
reported compliance disputes over a period of forty years).
60 One percent of the amount of the letter of credit is "a fairly standard fee in the industry" for
the issuance of the letter of credit for the first year, with an additional fee covering each additional
year at an amount less than one percent per year. See Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 07-21093-
CIV, 2008 WL 11333769, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2008) (stating that the applicant paid $60,000
for the issuance of a $6,030,500 letter of credit and an additional $88,000 for two years of renewal
of the letter of credit).
6
iThe U.C.C. provides:
An issuer has a reasonable time after presentation, but not beyond the end of the seventh
business day of the issuer after the day of its receipt of documents:
(1) to honor,
(2) if the letter of credit provides for honor to be completed more than seven
business days after presentation, to accept a draft or incur a deferred obligation, or
(3) to give notice to the presenter of discrepancies in the presentation.
U.C.C. § 5-108(b).
BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
established.6 2 As a result, the court denied the motion to dismiss, as the facts
as alleged in the complaint, taken as true, stated a cause of action for
injunctive relief. 63 In doing so, the court, in an opinion by Judge Shientag,
initially stressed the importance of the independence principle in the
following language:
It would be a most unfortunate interference with business
transactions if a bank before honoring drafts drawn upon it
was obliged or even allowed to go behind the documents at
the request of the buyer and enter controversies between the
buyer and the seller regarding the quality ofthe merchandise
shipped. If the buyer and the seller intended the bank to do
this they could have so provided in the letter of credit itself
and in the absence of such a provision the court will not
demand or even permit the bank to delay paying drafts which
are proper in form. Of course, the application of this doctrine
presupposes that the documents accompanying the draft are
genuine and conform in terms to the requirements of the
letter of credit.'
However, in denying the motion to dismiss, the court judicially engrafted
an exception to the principle in the following words:
[W]here the seller's fraud has been called to the bank's
attention before the drafts and documents have been
presented for payment, the principle of independence of the
bank's obligation under the letter of credit should not be
extended to protect the unscrupulous seller.6 5
62 Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632-33 (N.Y. Special Term
1941) (noting that, under the posture of the case, "every intendment and fair inference is in favor of
the pleading" (citations omitted)).
"Id. at 636.
6Id. at 633-34 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
6sId. at 634 (drawing a distinction between a mere breach of warranty concerning the quality
of the merchandise and a situation where the seller intentionally fails to ship the goods provided for
in the contract). In addressing the issue of fraud versus breach of warranty, the court stated:
Although our courts have used broad language to the effect that a letter of credit is
independent of the primary contract between the buyer and seller, that language was used
in cases concerning alleged breaches of warranty; no case has been brought to my
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The well-plead allegations in the complaint were taken as established facts
supporting a finding of fraud not only in the documents presented,6 but also
in the underlying sales transaction because of the shipping of rubbish as
opposed to the contracted-for bristles. The court did assert, however, that if
the presentment of the draft had been by a holder in due course, the bank
would have honored the presentation, "even though the primary transaction
was tainted with fraud." 6 8 It is important to note that the judicial recognition
attention on this point involving an intentional fraud on the part of the seller which was
brought to the bank's notice with the request that it withhold payment of the draft on this
account. The distinction between a breach of warranty and active fraud on the part of the
seller is supported by authority and reason. As one court has stated: "Obviously, when
the issuer of a letter of credit knows that a document, although correct in form, is, in point
of fact, false or illegal, he cannot be called upon to recognize such a document as
complying with the terms of a letter of credit."
Id. at 634-35 (quoting Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Lawyers' Title & Tr. Co., 2 Cir., 297 F. 152, 158, cert.
denied 265 U.S. 585, 44 S. Ct. 459, 68 L. Ed. 1192).
Earlier, the New York Court of Appeals had held that the issuing bank was bound to make
payment under a letter of credit if the documents conformed to the credit, "irrespective of whether
it knew, or had reason to believe," that the merchandise was not of the quality that had been
contracted for. See Maurice O'Meara Co. v. Nat'l Park Bank of N.Y., 146 N.E.2d 636, 639 (N.Y.
1925) (noting the issuer had no obligation to determine, by personal examination or otherwise, if
the merchandise conformed to the sales contract). The court also noted:
It has never been held, so far as I am able to discover, that a bank has the right or is under
an obligation to see that the description of the merchandise contained in the documents
presented is correct. A provision giving it such right, or imposing such obligation, might,
of course, be provided for in the letter of credit.
Id.
Judge Cardoza dissented, arguing that if the bank determined that the merchandise delivered
was not the same merchandise as the documents described, it should not be compelled to pay the
seller. Id. at 401. It has been asserted that Old Colony's dictum, relating to the knowledge of the
issuer of the fraud, with Cardoza's strong dissenting opinion in O'Meara, that "almost all the bricks
and mortar for building the fraud rule were assembled and all that was needed to give birth to the
fraud rule was a case like Sztejn." Ross P. Buckley & Xiang Gao, The Development of the Fraud
Rule in Letter of Credit Law: The Journey so Far and the Road Ahead, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
663, 676 (2002).
"Sztejn, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 632 (noting that the complaint alleged that the documents
accompanying the drafts were fraudulent).
61Id. at 634 (stating that, for purposes of the motion, "it must be assumed that the seller has
intentionally failed to ship any goods ordered by the buyer").
681d. at 635 (following the holder in due course exception to the fraud rule, even though there
was contrary authority).
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of the fraud exception and the resultant injunctive relief was based on actual
knowledge by the issuer of the fraud by the beneficiary-an event that rarely,
in fact, occurs.
The very next year, in Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank v. National City
BankofNew York,69 Judge Shientag had the opportunity to clarify her holding
in the Sztejn case. That case involved an underlying sales contract between
Silverman and the U.S. Army for the purchase of surplus clothing.70
Silverman made application to Asbury to issue letters of credit as required in
the sales contract to secure payment for the goods.7 ' The Army then required
additional letters of credit to be issued by other banks, and Asbury was able
to get National City to issue those letters of credit.72 After several years,
Asbury requested National City not to honor anymore drafts drawn on its
letters of credit, but National City refused the request and continued to honor
the presentations under its letters that complied with the terms and conditions
of its letters of credit.73 Asbury's request to National City was based upon an
assertion that the beneficiary of the letters of credit and the purchaser of the
surplus clothing were using the letters of credits to defraud Asbury.7 4 The
court noted that, unlike Sztejn, there were no allegations that Silverman did
not receive the goods or that the goods did not conform to the terms of the
contract.75 The court strongly reinforced the independence principle by
clarifying that its earlier fraud exception was limited to "such a fraud on the
part of the seller that there were no goods shipped even though shipping
tickets were presented."76 The court held that:





721d. (noting that National City required Asbury Bank to collateralize the letters of credit issued
by National City with certain securities).
73 id.
74Id. at 988 (alleging that the beneficiary's holding of the drafts and not presenting them for
payment until the purchaser failed to pay for the goods was an improper use of the credit and
amounted to fraud).
75Id.
761d. at 988-89 (citing its own Sztejn case in support of this statement). In this regard, the court
stated:
However, the reasons for the doctrine stated above [the independence principle] apply
with greater force to the situation presented in the instant case. The efficacy of the letter
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It would be improper to hold up the payment of drafts by the
issuing bank [National City] pending the result of such
litigation between the correspondent bank [Asbury] and the
buyer or seller. Plaintiffs [Asbury] only remedy would be
in an action against the Army and Silverman Brothers. It
could have protected itself by requiring ample security from
Silverman Brothers, or by requiring bills of lading or other
documents of title to be presented to the issuing bank as a
condition to payment of the drafts.
These two cases clearly establish that the fraud exception, as initially
introduced in American jurisprudence, was very limited and was applicable
only in the case of a total failure of the beneficiary to perform the underlying
sales contract but producing documents that complied with the credit. Other
than these two cases, there were essentially no other appellate courts'
decisions that expanded the degree of fraud necessary for the application of
the fraud exception prior to the promulgation of the U.C.C.78
of credit as an instrument for financing trade is the primary consideration. The contract
between the seller and purchaser involves the transaction of trade which calls into being
the letter of credit; whereas the correspondent bank's [Asbury Park] contract with the
purchaser is merely a collateral financial transaction. Ifthe letter of credit is to be treated
as independent of the contract between seller and buyer in order to render it an effective
instrument of trade, certainly it must be regarded as completely independent of the
contract between the correspondent bank and the purchaser. There was no contract at all
between the plaintiff correspondent bank and the seller of the goods, who was the
beneficiary of the credits. It therefore follows that a notice given by the correspondent
bank to the issuing bank to the effect that the former was defrauded by either the buyer,
the seller or both, is ineffective to void or suspend the operation of the letter of credit.
Any other rule would destroy the effectiveness of this valuable commercial device.
Id. at 989.
1
7 Id. at 989.
7
8See, e.g., HARFIELD, supra note 48, at 82, n.18 (stating that the principles enunciated in Sztejn
were applied in three subsequent cases, including the Asbury Park case, with the other two cases
decided in 1960 and 1967). See generally Chester B. McLaughlin, The Letter of Credit Provisions
ofthe Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1378, n.22 (1950) (noting that
the proposed fraud exception in the original 1949 draft of the U.C.C. had judicial support, citing
only the Sztejn and the Asbury Park cases). In Kingdom ofSweden v. N.Y Tr. Co., 96 N.Y.S.2d 779,
790 (N.Y. Special Term 1949), the court cited the Sztejn case for the proposition that the issuing
bank, absent a requirement in the letter of credit itself, should not go behind the documents to
determine whether the goods comported to the sales contract, "unless such documents were not
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V. THE U.C.C. AND THE FRAUD EXCEPTION
Like Prior Article 5 of the U.C.C., Revised Article 5 applies equally to
both commercial letters of credit and to standby letters of credit.79 Thus, there
are no special U.C.C. rules under Article 5 that apply to one or the other.80
genuine on their face or did not conform with the requirements of the letter of credit." (emphasis
added).
79See, e.g., BARNES ET AL., supra note 39, at 9 (noting that U.C.C. Article 5 applies "one law
for all letters of credit"); CRM Collateral, II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metro. Trans. Dist. of Or., 669 F.3d
963, 969 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Revised Article 5 to a standby letter of credit); Roman Ceramics
Corp. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 714 F.2d 1207, 1212-16 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying Prior Article 5 to a
commercial letter of credit); ACR Sys., Inc. v. Woori Bank, 232 F. Supp. 3d 471,476-78 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (applying Revised Article 5 to a commercial letter of credit); Am. Bell Int'l, Inc., v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying Prior Article 5 to a standby
letter of credit). See also Revised Article 5, Prefatory Note: Reasons for Revision, 2B UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) 126 (asserting that the increasing use of standby letters of credit since
the enactment of the original U.C.C. was a reason for the revision of Article 5 of the U.C.C.)
[hereinafter cited as U.C.C. § 5 Prefatory Note page number].
soWhile beyond the scope of this Article, there are other regimes that apply to both commercial
letters of credit and standby letters of credit. There is the Uniform Customs & Practice for
Documentary Credits (UCP 600), which is a codification by the International Chamber of
Commerce of the international financial standards used by financial institutions that deal in
commercial letters of credit. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS & PRACTICES
FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS, 2007 REVISIoN (ICC Pub. No. 600, 2006). Article I of the UCP 600
states that it applies to any letter of credit in which it is incorporated, including to the extent possible
standby letters of credit. Id. art. I (stating that the UCP applies to any documentary credit). The ICC
is an international business group with members from over 130 countries. See International
Chamber of Commerce, GLOBAL FORUM ON CYBER EXPERTISE,
https://www.thegfce.com/members-and-partners/members/icc (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
However, because of the differences in usage and purpose of standby letters of credit, specific
rules in the international context were developed through the Institute of International Banking Law
& Practice, Inc. and the International Financial Services Association. See JAMES E. BYRNE, THE
OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL STANDBY PRACTICES xvi-xvii (Inst. Int'l L. &
Pract. 1988) (noting that the process included participation of every segment of the letter of credit
community). Those rules are found in ISP 98 (International Standby Practices). INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. 590E (1998). See also JAMES E. BYRNE, THE OFFICIAL
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL STANDBY PRACTICES v (Inst. Int'l L. & Pract. 1988)
(stating that he International Chamber of Commerce endorses ISP 98). However, neither The UCP
or the ISP have a fraud exception to a demand for honor under a letter of credit. However, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade has made an effort to deal with fraud in standby letters
of credit. See United National Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of
Credit, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (1995). See
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/guarantees/guarantees.pdf Articles 19 and 20
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Both before and after the initial enactment of Prior Article 5 of the U.C.C.,
there was substantial literature concerning the nature and legal approach to
handling letters of credit.8 ' One of the issues that was discussed in the
literature was how to deal with fraud in the letter of credit transaction, in the
underlying contract, or in the documents that were presented to the issuer.8 2
The Prior Article 5 contained a provision addressing fraud in the documents
and fraud in the transaction and authorizing a court under appropriate
circumstances to enjoin payment under a letter of credit.83 However, the
of that Convention incorporate a fraud exception to the honoring of standby letters of credit and
provide for provisional court measures. Id. However, only eight countries have ratified or accepted
the convention. Those eight countries are: Belarus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Kuwait, Liberia,
Panama, and Tunisia; and although the United States signed the convention in 1997, it has not yet
been ratified. See Status: United National Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby
Letters of Credit (New York 1995), UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/payments/1 995Convention.guaranteesstatus.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
8 t See, e.g., HARFIELD, supra note 48; John F. Dolan, Letter of Credit Litigation Under UCC
Article 5: A Case of Statutory Preemption, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1269 (2011); Byrne, supra note 43;
Boris Kozolchyk, The Legal Nature of the Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit, 14 AM. J. OF
COMPARATIVE L. 395 (1965); Norman I. Miller, Problems and Patterns of the Letter of Credit,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INT'L TRADE 162 (1959); A.C. Epps & Harvey Chappell, Jr., Assimilation of
the Letter of Credit by the Common Law, 38 VIRGINIA L. REV. 531 (1952); Philip W. Thayer,
Irrevocable Credits in International Commerce: Their Legal Nature, 36 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1031
(1936); William E. McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, 35 HARV. L. REV. 539 (1922); Omer
F. Hershey, Letters of Credit, 32 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1918).
82See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 4, at 487-90 (arguing for a limited role for the fraud exception);
Xiang & Buckley, supra note 4, at 298-310 (discussing the various standard the courts used to
determine fraud under the Prior Article 5); Buckley & Gao, supra note 4, at 681-88 (examining the
treatment of the fraud rule under the Prior Article 5 and the Revised Article 5); Edward L. Symons,
Letters of Credit: Fraud, Good Faith and the Basis for Injunctive Relief, 54 TUL. L. REV. 338, 345-
52 (1980) (discussing the various standards that the courts have used in determining whether there
is fraud); Henry Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING L.J. 596 (1978)
(arguing for an egregious fraud standard).
"The pertinent provisions of the original fraud provision in the Prior U.C.C. stated:
Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to comply with the terms
of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform to the warranties made on
negotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section 7-507) or of a security (Section 8-
306) or is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction:
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is demanded by
a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand which has taken the draft
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provision gave little guidance as to the standard of fraud that the courts should
use in addressing the problem,8 or whether fraud in the transaction referred
to the underlying transaction or referred merely to the letter of credit
transaction. As noted above, some commentators asserted that the Sztejn
or demand under the credit and under circumstances which would make it a holder
in due course (Section 3-302) and in an appropriate case would make it a person to
whom a document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-502) or a bona fide
purchaser of a security (Section 8-302); and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith may honor
the draft or demand for payment despite notification from the customer of fraud,
forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the documents but a court of
appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor.
Prior U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (emphasis added). It should be noted that in 1994, the introductory
paragraph to Prior U.C.C. § 5-114(2) was amended to reflect the 1994 revisions to Article 8, such
that the reference to Section 8-306 was changed to Section 8-108. Id.
"The Official Comment to the § 5-114 was silent as to the standard of fraud. However, the
provision did address the duty of the issuer to honor a presentation, in spite of fraud, where the
person making the presentation was similar to an Article 3 holder in due course, or was a person to
whom a document of title had been negotiated under Article 7 of the Prior Code, or was a bona fide
purchaser of securities under Article 8 of the Prior Code. See Prior U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a). See also
id. § 5-114, cmt. 2 (noting that, in these situations, the risk of fraudulent actions by the beneficiary
should lie with the applicant who chose to enter into the transaction with the beneficiary rather than
on innocent third parties or the issuer).
"See Symons, supra note 82, at 368 (stating that, in most transactions, the underlying contract
cannot be distinguished from the letter of credit transaction); Dolan, supra note 19, at 16-20, n.26
(asserting several arguments for the position that the fraud exception should be limited to fraud in
the documents); Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 730 F.2d 19, 23-25 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating that the
fraud exception includes fraud in the underlying transaction); W. Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka,
415 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (limiting the fraud inquiry to the credit transaction). See
also Dolan, supra note 4, at 88-89 (arguing that courts should confine their investigation of fraud
to the letter of credit transaction). In this article Professor Dolan admitted that his efforts to limit
the fraud inquiry had been largely unsuccessful. Id. (noting the Official Comment in the Revised
Article § 5-109, making it quite clear that the fraud inquiry may include inquiry into the underlying
transaction).
See also Prior U.C.C. § 5-114, cmt. 2 (stating merely that the applicant bore the risk of fraud
in the transaction). Prior to 1957, the fraud rule appeared in §§ 5-111(1), (2) and was limited in
application to "fraud in a required document." See 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL
BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 201, reprinted in XVIII THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS (compiled by E. Kelley 1984). The recommendations of the Editorial
Board were to move the fraud section to Article 5-114(2) and to add additional language concerning
"fraud in the transaction." Id. at 204-05. The reason given for the recommended change was
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case was codified in Prior Article 5.86 However, even that case gave little
guidance on the standard of fraud. In fact, it merely held that an intentional
failure to ship any goods that were the subject of the underlying sales contract
would be a fraudulent transaction. Furthermore, the case law interpreting
the fraud provision of Prior § 5-114(2) was not consistent, as the courts used
differing standards to determine whether there was fraud either in the
documents or transaction. These standards included egregious fraud,"
"[s]ubsection (2) clarifies by cross-reference the intent of old Section 5-1 11(1) and (2)." Id. at 205.
The 1957 Official Text of the U.C.C. adopted the recommendations and included both "fraud in a
document" and "fraud in the transaction" in the new Section 5-114(2). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: 1957 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS (THROUGH ARTICLE 6) 449-450, reprinted in XIX
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS (compiled by E. Kelley 1984).
86See, e.g., Xiang & Buckley, supra note 4, at 298 (stating that the Sztejn case was codified in
the Prior Article 5); Buckley & Gao, supra note 4, at 676 (asserting that not only has the Sztejn case
been codified in the UCC, but it "has been cited with approval and followed throughout the common
law world"); Symons, supra note 82, at 340 (noting that "[t]he section 5-114 standard is generally
acknowledge to be a codification ofthe leading pre-Code case"). See also John F. Dolan, THE LAW
OF LETTERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY CREDITS ¶7.04[3], 7-38 (2d ed. 1991)
(stating that Section 5-114(2) of the Prior U.C.C. codified the Sztejn rule).
87Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634-35 (N.Y. Special Term
1941) (citing the Old Colony case for the additional proposition that when an issuer knows that a
document present was false or illegal, the issuer has no obligation to honor the presentation).
88See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Tr., 378 A.2d 562, 567 (Conn. 1977)
(noting that the prior fraud provision applied in rare situations of egregious fraud that would vitiate
the transaction); Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Tr. Bank, 336 A.2d 316, 324-25 (Pa. 1975)
(holding that the fraud required had to so vitiate "the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes
of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be served"); GATX Leasing Corp.
v. DBM Drilling Corp., 657 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ) (stating that
it took egregious fraud to obtain an injunction under the Prior Article 5).
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intentional fraud,8 9 a flexible standard,90 or common law fraud.91 One of the
reasons for so many divergent views on what constituted fraud was the
"slippery character of fraud in U.S. jurisprudence."92 In addition, as Section
5-114(2) gave no guidance as to what the requirements were for injunctive
relief,93 the "courts typically applied the forum's general test for issuance of
injunctive relief." 94 This lack of uniformity in the standard of fraud, the scope
of fraud, and in the standards for injunctive relief revealed critical
weaknesses in letters of credit jurisprudence, lessening their usefulness as
viable instruments in international trade. 95
89See, e.g., Aetna Life & Cas. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 934 F.2d 695, 702 (6th Cir. 1991)
(noting that it was not necessary for the court to determine if the requirements of common law fraud
had been met because the issuer in a case of fraud in the transaction must only show intentional
fraud (citing Allservices Exportacao v. Banco Bamerindus, 921 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1990))); Am.
Bell Int'l v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting that the
beneficiary had failed to demonstrate "the kind of evil intent necessary to support a claim of fraud").
"Several decisions attempted to look at the circumstances of the situation and drew a
distinction between breach of warranty and outright fraud, as the court did in the Sztejn. See, e.g.,
Philipp Bros., Inc. v. Oil Country Specialist, Ltd., 709 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1986, writ dism'd) (finding that the substandard condition ofthe oil field pipe was pervasive
enough to render the entire inventory worthless and constituted fraud, not a mere breach of contract);
United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 360 N.E.2d 943, 949 (N.Y. 1976) (finding
that fraud in the transaction, similar to the Sztejn case, occurred when the delivered merchandise
comprised fragments of boxing gloves rather than real boxing gloves).
91See WKB Enter. v. Ruan Leasing Co., 838 F. Supp. 529, 533 (D. Utah 1993) (holding that
the applicant for the letter of credit was not entitled to injunctive relief in part because he failed to
prove that the issuer had relied on the misrepresentation); Brown v. U.S. Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 371
N.W.2d 692, 699 (Neb. 1985) (holding that "the material elements of common-law fraud must be
established before any relief is available for the 'fraud' contemplated by Section 5-114(2)" (citation
omitted)).
92The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1614-15 (noting that
fraud under the U.C.C. does not need to rise to the level of criminal fraud as in many civil law
jurisdictions).
93See Prior U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (providing merely that a court could enjoin an honor).
9"See The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1610-11 (noting that
although the courts generally weighed factors, such as probability of success, irreparable injury,
private and public interest, the decisions cited by the Task Force varied on which factor was more
important).
95The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5 stated the following about the fraud
exception:
The most critical facet of letter of credit law, the availability of injunctive relief in the
case of fraudulent conduct as an exception to the requirement to honor facially
FRA UD, LETTERS OF CREDIT, AND THE UCC
In 1986,96 the U.C.C. Committee of the American Bar Association
appointed a Task Force of knowledgeable practitioners and academicians to
recommend changes to Article 5.97 After the Task Force had made extensive
review of the case law and the evolving technologies and changes in customs
and practices, it made significant recommendations for revisions to Prior
Article 5.98 In its Prefatory Note: Reason for Revision the Task Force stated:
[A]imost forty years of hard use have revealed
weaknesses, gaps, and errors in the original statute which
compromise it relevance .
Measured in terms of these areas which are vital to any
system of commercial law, the current combination of
statute and case law is found wanted in major respects both
in predictability and certainty. What is at issue here are not
matters of sophistry but important issues of substance which
have not be resolved by the current caselaw/code method
admit of little likelihood of such resolution. 99
With regard to the fraud provision, the Task Force concluded that U.S.
trial judges issued too many injunctions preventing issuers from honoring
credits, and therefore it recommended the preparation of a written
commentary to the fraud provision clarifying the bases for the issuance of
injunctive relief. 1 With respect to the proper standard for fraud, the Task
conforming documents, has proven to be a threatening cancer. What warrants injunctive
relief is unclear as is the scope of fraud-potentially so broad under U.S. common law
as to encompass conduct in which there is not element of intent-and the mechanisms by
which relief is to be granted.
The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1534.
9 The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1527.
97See U.C.C. § 5, Prefatory Note: Reason for Revision 127.
98Id.
99 Id.
'" The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1612. The Report of the
Task Force stated:
Interlocutory relief which prevents payment following presentment or, worse, which
forces the beneficiary to litigate in a distant court is tolerable only if as a threshold
consideration a court has concluded that the demand is probably forged or fraudulent and
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Force suggested a "narrowly gauged standard" alerting the courts and the
parties that "not just any fraud will suffice."' Some members of the Task
Force also suggested adding a commentary to the fraud provision with a list
of approved and disapproved cases.102 However, others members proposed
rewriting the entire provision "in light of the increasing desirability of
harmonization with other legal systems."10 3 In its final report the Task Force
proposed a stringent standard of fraud to prevent the reallocation of risks that
had been agreed upon by the parties to the underlying transaction.
Following the Task Force's Report, the Drafting Committee, after
consultation and discussions with various groups including the Task Force 0 5
adopted the following fraud provision:
(a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly
to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of
credit, but a required document is forged or materially
has imposed conditions on the maintenance ofpreliminary injunctive reliefthat will deter
the plaintiff from falsely claiming forgery or fraud.
The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1612. See also MCCULLOUGH,
supra note 47, at 61 (stating that "[p]erhaps no other subject has generated as much litigation
regarding letters of credit as that of the injunction against honor").
'1 The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1615. The Task Force,
realizing that the formulation of a fraud standard was difficult, wrote as follows:
The term "fraud in the transaction", at least, has the advantage of familiarity. "Egregious"
fills a void in the current term regarding the requisite degree of fraud although it is hardly
precise. Another approach is to focus on the notion that the purpose of the underlying
transaction must be rendered virtually without value for an injunction to issue. This
approach may be less helpful in the case of standbys where a default occasions the
drawing. For standbys, the focus would be on whether the drawing has occurred with no
colorable basis whatsoever.
The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1615.
102 The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1615.
103 The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1616 (noting that
European cases in the area of forged or fraudulent documents had concluded that fraud was more
than a mere misstatement).
04 The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1617 (noting also that
injunctive relief "invites parties and courts to undermine the integrity of the credit by an end run").
'osU.C.C. § 5, Prefatory Note: Reasons for Revision 127 (noting that the Drafting Committee's
final work varied from many of the suggestions of the Task Force); U.C.C. § 5, Prefatory Note:
Process ofAchieving Uniformity 128 (summarizing the various meetings ofthe Drafting Committee
and the consultation process of that Committee).
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fraudulent, or honor of the presentation would facilitate a
material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant:
(1) the issuer shall honor the presentation if honor is
demanded by:
(A) a nominated person who has given value in good
faith and without notice of forgery or material fraud;
(B) a confirmer who has honored its confirmation in
good faith;
(C) a holder in due course of a draft drawn under the
letter of credit that was taken after acceptance by the
issuer or nominated person; or
(D) an assignee of the issuer's or nominated
person's deferred obligation that was taken for value
and without notice of forgery or material fraud after
the obligation was incurred by the issuer or
nominated person; and
(2) the issuer, acting in good faith, may honor or
dishonor the presentation in any other case.
(b) If an applicant claims that a required document is forged
or materially fraudulent or that honor of the presentation
would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the
issuer or applicant, a court of competent jurisdiction may
temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer from honoring
a presentation or grant similar relief against the issuer or
other persons only if the court finds that:
(1) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable
to an accepted draft or deferred obligation incurred by
the issuer;
(2) a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may
be adversely affected is adequately protected against
loss that it may suffer because the relief is granted;
(3) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief
under the law of this state have been met; and
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(4) on the basis of the information submitted to the court,
the applicant is more likely than not to succeed under its
claim of forgery or material fraud and the person
demanding honor does not qualify for protection under
Subsection (a)(1).10
The Revised Article 5 adopts "material fraud" as the fraud standard, but the
provision does not define the term, leaving that issue to the courts.107
However, the Official Comment refers to various articulations found in cases
that identify what actions would amount to material fraud.08 The listed
articulations include: no colorable right to expect honor;109 no basis in fact to
support honor;110 the beneficiary's conduct vitiates the entire transaction; "1
and the underlying contract plainly establishes that the beneficiary has no
right to draw on the letter of credit." 2 The fraud provision also makes it clear
that the material fraud must either be found in the documents or have been
'0 6U.C.C. § 5-109.
'See id. at cmt. I (leaving it to the courts to "decide the breadth and width of 'materiality"').
The Official Comment does, however, give an example of a sales contract for 1,000 barrels of salad
oil and states that an invoice for 1,000 barrels when only 998 barrels were delivered would not be
materially fraudulent, but a knowing delivery of only 5 barrels and presenting an invoice showing
1,000 barrels would be materially fraudulent. Id.
'"Id. (indorsing articulations such as those stated in Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank,
336 A.2d 316 (Pa. 1975), Roman Ceramics Corp. v. People's Nat. Bank, 714 F.2d 1207 (3rd Cir.
1983), and similar decisions and embracing certain decisions under Section 5-114 that relied upon
the phrase "fraud in the transaction").
1'9See Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 730 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that
an injunction would lie to prevent the honoring of a presentation where the beneficiary "did not
even have a colorable claim").
"See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 999 (N.D. Ga.
1973) (noting that the court's task was simply assuring that he beneficiary "not be allowed to take
unconscientious advantage of the situation and run off with plaintiff's money on a pro forma
declaration which has absolutely no basis n fact"); Intraworld, 336 A.2d at 325 (noting that an
injunction to prevent the honoring ofa presentation would be proper when the beneficiary had "no
bona fide claim to payment").
".See Intraworld, 336 A.2d at 324-25 (stating that the grounds for issuance of an injunction
should be narrowly limited to those situations where the fraud of the beneficiary "so vitiates the
entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer's obligation would
no longer be served").
ll 2See Itek, 730 F.2d at 24 (noting that the fraud exception "recognizes the unfairness of
allowing a beneficiary to call a letter of credit under circumstances where the underlying contract
plainly shows that he is not to do so").
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committed by the beneficiary on the issuer or the applicant."3 Finally, in
response to the Task Force's Recommendation,114 the new provision spells
out the specific requirements for the granting of injunction relief.'"'
The revised fraud provision immunizes four parties from the risks of
fraud, and the issuer must honor their presentation that strictly conforms to
the terms and conditions of the letter of credit even if "a required document
is forged or materially fraudulent, or honor of the presentation would
facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant."" 6
The protected parties are:
(i) a nominated person who has given value in good faith and
without notice of forgery or material fraud, (ii) a confirmer
who has honored its confirmation in good faith, (iii) a holder
in due course of a draft drawn under the letter of credit which
was taken after acceptance by the issuer or nominated
person, or (iv) an assignee of the issuer's or nominated
person's deferred obligation that was taken for value and
without notice of forgery or material fraud after the
obligation was incurred by the issuer or nominated
117person ....
. U.C.C. § 5-109, cmt. 1 (citing Cromwell v. Commerce & Energy Bank, 464 So.2d 721 (La.
1985)).
I
4See The Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 54, at 1612 (noting the
need for the fraud provision to "spell out the basis on which temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions should or should not be issued").
"sSee U.C.C. § 5-109(b) (providing generally that an injunction will lie to enjoin the honoring
of a presentation if the conditions of state law for the entry of an injunction are met, the applicant is
more likely than not to succeed on his claim of fraud or forgery, and the interest of the parties who
may be adversely affected are adequately protected).
" 6 Id. § 5-109(a)(1). There is no equivalent protection in negotiable instruments law, where the
holder in due course is only protected against personal defenses, but not the real defenses one of
which is fraud "that induced the obligor to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor
reasonable opportunity to learn of its character or its essential terms. " Id. § 3-305(a)(1), (b).
."See U.C.C. § 5-109(a)(1). The Official Comment relating to this specific section is short and
concise:
Section 5-109(a)(1) also protects specified third parties against the risks of fraud. By
issuing a letter of credit that nominates a person to negotiate or pay, the issuer (ultimately
the applicant) induces that nominated person to give value and thereby assumes the risk
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The first two protect parties are nominated persons acting pursuant to their
respective nomination. Thus, a nominated person who gives value in good
faith"s without notice" 9 of forgery or material fraud is entitled to be
reimbursed,'20 as well the nominated person who is a confirmer who acts in
good faith without the requirement of giving value'21 or not having notice of
the fraud by the beneficiary.122 Thus, a confirmer who honors its confirmation
that a draft drawn under the letter of credit will be transferred to one with a status like
that of a holder in due course who deserves to be protected against a fraud defense.
U.C.C. § 5-109, cmt. 6. Some of these immunized persons are similar to those protected against the
fraud exception in Prior Article 5. See Prior U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a).
"8 Good faith is defined for purposes of Revised Article 5 as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(7). The general definition of good faith that is applicable
to the other articles of the U.C.C. includes not only honesty in fact but "observances of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing." Id. § 1-201(20) (noting specifically that this expansive
definition does not apply in Chapter 5). See also Id. § 5-102(a)(7), Official Comment 3 (stating that
Article 5 has a narrower definition of good faith than other Articles of the U.C.C.).
" 9 As notice is not defined in Revised Article 5, the definition in Revised Article I applies. See
Id. § 5-102(c) (stating that Article I of the U.C.C. contains some additional definition that are
applicable throughout Revised Article 5). U.C.C. § 1-202(a), (b) states, in relevant part:
(a) . .. ,a person has "notice" of a fact if that person:
(1) has actual knowledge of it;
(2) has received a notice or notification of it; or
(3) from all the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time in
question, has reason to know that it exists.
(b) "Knowledge" means actual knowledge. "Know" has a corresponding meaning.
U.C.C. § 1-202(a), (b).
120U.C.C. § 5-109(a)(1)(i) (noting that a nominated person can avoid the fraud exception by
giving value in "good faith without notice of forgery or material fraud"). A nominated person is
typically designated in those situations where the issuer and the beneficiary operate in different
locations, and the beneficiary might desire to obtain payment from a local financial institution. See
Dole, supra note 22, at 743.
121 See Byrne, supra note 48, at 586 (stating that when the confirmer gives its irrevocable
promise there is no question of value).
122 The confirmer "is directly obligated on a letter of credit and has the rights and obligations
of an issuer to the extent of its confirmation." U.C.C. § 5-107(a) (treating the interrelationship
between the two just as if the issuer were the applicant and the confirmer had issued the letter of
credit). Official Comment I to U.C.C. § 5-108 notes that the confirmer has the same rights and
duties of an issuer.
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in good faith is entitled to reimbursement even though he was notified of
alleged material fraud.12 3
The last two immunized persons do not necessarily need to be nominated
persons and involve situations of delayed payment. 124 The first of these is the
situation of a holder in due course of accepted time drafts drawn under the
letter of credit after their acceptance25 by the issuer or a nominated person.12 6
In a typical letter of credit transaction involving a time draft, the issuer or
confirmer will accept the beneficiary's written order for payment (typically
a time draft) in a certain number of days after a designated date. Once the
time draft is accepted, any holder in due course of that draft is immune from
the fraud exception. The protection of this person rests not only on him being
a holder in due course, but upon the fact that he has acquired rights from
either the issuer or confirmer to an irrevocable obligation to pay. Thus, if the
issuer accepts a time draft drawn on the letter of credit, then any holder in
due course of that draft is immunized against an assertion of fraud defense
when the accepted draft is presented for payment.
The last immunized person is an assignee of the issuer's or nominated
person's deferred obligation taken for value and without notice of forgery or
1
23Dole, supra note 22, at 753 (noting the distinction between the confirmer and the other
immunized persons).
124These final two sources of immunity highlight the distinction between a negotiation credit
and a straight letter of credit. While the U.C.C. does not define either of these terms the law clearly
recognizes them. See Dole, supra note 22, at 764-68 (differentiating between the straight letter of
credit and the negotiation credit). To be a negotiation credit the "letter of credit must contain both a
clear undertaking by the issuer to reimburse a nominated negotiation bank that has negotiated and
a clear indication of the bank or banks nominated to negotiate." Id. at 765 (citing a New York Court
of Appeals decision that involved an express engagement in the letter of credit to honor drafts
presented by a negotiating bank who had purchased the signed drafts of the beneficiary). A straight
letter of credit contains only a commitment by the issuer to honor a demand for payment by the
beneficiary upon its performance of the terms and conditions of the credit. See MCCULLOUGH,
supra note 47, at 100 (stating such a letter contains no commitment to any person other than the
named beneficiary). Thus, if the letter of credit is a straight letter of credit a bank that purchases the
drafts of the beneficiary is not protected claims of fraud, and in effect is no better off than the
beneficiary. See WITE ET AL., supra note 23, at 261.
125 While Revised Article 5 does not contain a definition of accept or acceptance, it does state
that the definition in U.C.C. § 3-409 applies in this article. U.C.C. § 5-102(b). U.C.C. § 3-409(a)
provides that "'acceptance' means the drawee's signed agreement o pay a draft as presented. It
must be written on the draft and may consist of the drawee's signature alone." Thus, once the issuer
or confirmer accepts the draft by signing the draft, it becomes obligated to pay the draft.
126U.C.C. § 5-109(a)(1)(iii).
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material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the issuer or nominated
person. 127 A deferred payment obligation is an obligation that is contained in
the letter of credit itself undertaking to make payment a set number of days
after the presentation of conforming documents. 128 In this latter case, the
issuer or confirmer has unconditionally undertaken to pay the deferred
obligation at a later date.129 Thus, an assignee of that obligation has a clear
right to expect payment.'3 0 While the confirmer need only satisfy the
requirement of good faith,'' the other three immunities arise only in the case
of good faith without notice of forgery or material fraud.13 2
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that there are certain
limitations to the application of the fraud exception in letters of credit law to
protect certain parties. Thus, in letters of credit law, fraud, although abhorred,
is often overlooked for the protection of certain immunized persons such that
fraud does not always unravel the entire transaction. In each of these cases,
there are valid and acceptable policy reasons for requiring the independence
principle to exercise its true commercial role and to be untethered from the
fraud rule.
VI. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE FRAUD EXCEPTION
The fraud rule turns the unconditional undertaking of the issuer into a
conditional undertaking dependent upon the underlying contract. The
condition that it imposes on that undertaking in a typical commercial credit
situation is that the issuer can honor a strictly complying presentation, if and
1
271d. § 5-109(a)(1)(iv).
128A deferred payment letter of credit typically requires that the specified documents be
presented on a specified date and provides that payment will be made at some future date. See
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 47, at 94. See, e.g., First Union Bank v. Paribas, 135 F. Supp. 2d 443,
446 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving letters of credit providing for payment 180 days after the
presentation of documents).
129 See id.
130See BARNES ET AL., supra note 39, at 58 (1998) (stating that letter of credit policy "favors
protection of those who rely on the LC proceeds that are created when honor is initiated").
m31 Compare U.C.C. § 5-109(a)(1)(ii) (noting that a confirmer need only have honored its
confirmation in good faith), with id. § 5-109(a)(1)(i) (noting that a nominated person must give
value in good faith and without notice of the fraud or forgery).
1
32See id. § 5-109(a)(1)(i) & (iv) (stating those requirements explicitly; while U.C.C § 5-
109(a)(iii) immunity requires qualification as a holder in due course). See also id. § 3-302(a) (2)
(requiring a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument to acquire it in good faith and without
notice of a claim or defense).
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only if, the underlying contract between the applicant and the beneficiary has
not been materially breached. Thus, for example, where the merchandise is
never shipped or fails to comply in any respect to the contracted-for
merchandise, the issuer can be enjoined from honoring the presentation even
if the documents strictly comply. The condition that the fraud rule imposes
on the typical standby credit is that the issuer can honor a strictly complying
presentation, if and only if, the underlying contract between the applicant and
the beneficiary has not been breached. The imposition of these conditions for
honoring a presentation strips the beneficiary of the bargain that he
contracted for. 13 3 The imposition of these conditions for honoring a
presentation breaches the issuer's undertaking to the beneficiary to honor a
3
1Professor Dolan summarized the harm to the beneficiary when the independence principle
was compromised by a fraud inquiry in the following words:
[A]nd sometimes at the close of the [fraud] inquiry the court may decide that there is no
fraud. By then it is too late to protect the beneficiary, who has lost his bargain, and too
late to protect the credit, which is no longer a unique device but only another kind of
bond. Even if the court finds at the end of that inquiry that there is fraud, the process has
occurred in a forum and under circumstances contrary to the bargain the parties struck.
In addition, the account party, after enjoying the fruits of the credit ex ante, has avoided
the cost of litigating without the funds in the beneficiary's forum.
Dolan, supra note 19, at 15-16.
The Supreme Court of Alabama explained the benefits of the standby letter of credit to the
beneficiary in the following words:
The beneficiary of the standby credit reasonably expects to receive payment from the
issuer promptly upon demand and before any litigation between the applicant and the
beneficiary may occur.. .. A demand for payment made upon a standby credit usually
indicated that something has gone wrong in the contract. Indeed, this is the nature of the
standby letter of credit. In contrast to the commercial credit nonperformance that triggers
payment in a standby credit situation usually indicates some form of financial weakness
by the applicant. For this reason parties choose this security arrangement over another so
they have the benefit of prompt payment before any litigation occurs.
S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. AmSouth Bank of Ala., 709 So. 2d 1180, 1184-85 (Ala. 1998) (citations
omitted). See e.g., Dolan, supra note 4, at 502 (noting that the courts need to resist efforts to reorder
the letter of credit transaction "ex post from a pay-now-argue-later egime to an argue-now-pay-
later regime"). Professor Dolan noted that the applicant should seek his remedy against the
beneficiary where he must pay the costs and assume the risks he undertook when it asked the bank
to issue the independent obligation. Id. See also Eakin v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi.,
875 F.2d 114, 116 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the promise and premise of letters of credit law are
"pay now, argue later").
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proper presentation pursuant to the independence principle and imposes
litigation time, and possible money and expenses, upon the issuer that were
not part of any contract or undertaking the issuer agreed to.134
However, it has been asserted that "[tlhe idea that fraud upsets the usual
rules of credits is an old one."'35 Rarely, if ever, have the courts given specific
`mThere is no doubt that the reimbursement agreement can contractually obligate the applicant
to reimburse the issuer for attorney's fees and expenses in any litigation that might arise under the
letter of credit. Furthermore, U.C.C. § 5-111(e) states: "[r]easonable attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation must be awarded to the prevailing party in an action which a remedy is sought
under the article." U.C.C. § 5-111(e). Official Comment 6 to U.C.C. § 5-111(e) states that an issuer
can be a prevailing party, although this would normally arise in those situations where it dishonored
a presentation and was successful in a subsequent suit by the beneficiary seeking payment.
Furthermore, this Comments states, "[s]ince the issuer may be entitled to recover its legal fees and
costs from the applicant under the reimbursement agreement, allowing the issuer to recover those
fees from a losing beneficiary may also protect the applicant from undeserved losses." Id. cmt. 6.
13'Buckley & Gao, supra note 4, at 669 (stating that "Pillans planted the seed of the fraud rule
at a time when letters of credit were barely born.") (citing DOLAN, supra note 25, at 17.03[1], 76,
76 n.22 (citing two English case-Pillans v. Van Mierop and Mason v. Hunt)). Pillans & Rose v.
Van Mierop & Hopkins, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1037 (K.B. 1765), involved a letter of credit. In that
case, plaintiffs extended credit to White, an Irish merchant. Id. at 1035. As a condition for accepting
drafts from White, plaintiffs desired an irrevocable letter of credit from a "house of Rank in
London." Id. White named defendants' house and plaintiffs honored White's drafts and paid the
money over to White. Id. Plaintiffs then wrote defendants asking them whether they would accept
bills as they would draw upon the credit of White. Id. Having received written assent "that they
would honour the plaintiffs' draughts," they drew on defendants. Id. at 1038. However, as White
had become bankrupt, defendants refused to honor the bills. Id. at 1035. The trial court held for
defendants pursuant to a verdict. Id.
On appeal, Lord Mansfield believed the defendants "were bound by their letter; unless there
was some fraud upon them," noting they had undertaking a mercantile transaction "to give credit
for Pillans and Rose's reimbursement." Id. at 1036. However, he saw no fraud. Id. On re-argument
the defendants asserted that there was a "fraudulent concealment of facts"-specifically that the
plaintiffs and White concealed the fact that this transaction was not for a future credit but was to
secure the past acceptance of White's bills by the plaintiffs establishing that the plaintiffs doubted
White's financial capabilities. Id. at 1037. In rejecting that argument Lord Mansfield stated, "If
there was any kind offraud in this transaction, the collusion and mala fides would have vacated the
contract. But from these letters, it seems clear, that there was none." Id. at 1038 (emphasis added)
(noting that there was no evidence that the plaintiffs doubted White's financial sufficiency). The
case in a broad sweep states "any kind of fraud" in the transaction can vacate the obligation of the
issuer to honor its letter of credit. However, in the case there were only allegations of fraud in the
issuance of the letter of credit, and no allegations of fraud in the payment of the letter of credit. The
alleged fraud was in the letter of credit formation and was perpetrated by the applicant or the
applicant and the beneficiary in collusion with each other.
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reasons for the fraud exception to the independence principle in letters of
credit law.1 36 Instead, the courts refer to the beneficiary as "unscrupulous,"'37
or "dishonest," 38 or describe the fraud sufficient to invoke the equitable
powers of the court as "egregious"l39 or "intentional."l4
The other case cited as authority for the birth of the fraud exception was Mason v. Hunt, 99
Eng. Rep. 192 (K.B. 1779). Although not a letter of credit case, the Mason case does raise the
specter of fraud as a justification for excusing a promisor from the obligation to accept a bill of
exchange. In that case there was an agreement o accept and pay bills of exchange for the purchase
of prize tobacco. Id. at 192. The agreement to accept the bills specifically stated that a "certain
number of hogsheads to be delivered-of a certain value rated by the hogshead." Id. at 194. The
tobacco that was delivered was of inferior French island tobacco which was worth substantially less
than the purchase price in the agreement. Id. The endorsee of the bills of exchange sought payment
of the full amount of the bills. Id. at 192. The case was tried before Lord Mansfield and a verdict
was rendered for the defendants. Id. at 193. A rule for a new trial was obtained, but after argument
it was discharged. Id. at 194. Lord Mansfield believed the great difference in value of the tobacco
"is such a fraud as to entitle the defendants to relief against the agreement." Id. However, the court
did not determine whether there had been fraud as there was no evidence as to how the decrease in
value occurred. Id. at 194. The court noted that the endorsee took the bills and was aware of the
conditions as to quality and was bound by the terms of the agreement. Id. However, the grounds
given for the inability to recover was not based on fraud, but on the fact that the endorsee had signed
an agreement that he would take the bills of lading and sell the tobacco for his own account in part
payment of the bills of exchange. Id. The court noted that defendants would not have accepted the
bills without the security of the goods and the insurance which remained with the endorsee. Id. See
also Coolidge v. Payson, 15 U.S. 66, 73 (1817) (Marshall, C.J.) (observing that "[a]ny ingredient




37See, e.g., Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (N.Y. Special
Term 1941) (stating that the issuer's obligation under the independence principle should not be
extended to protect an unscrupulous beneficiary). See also Buckley & Gao, supra note 4, at 665
(referring to the beneficiaries who present forged or fraudulent documents as fraudsters).
138See, e.g., United City Merch. v. Royal Bank of Can., 1 A.C. 168, 184 (1983) (stating the
"[t]he exception of fraud on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail himself of the credit is a
clear application of the maxim ex turpi cause non oritur actio, or, if plain English is to be preferred,
'fraud unravels all.' The courts will not allow their process to be used by a dishonest person to carry
out the fraud.").
"'See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Tr., 378 A.2d 562, 567 (Conn. 1977)
(stating that the fraud provision applied in rare situations of egregious fraud that would vitiate the
transaction).
'4See, e.g., Aetna Life & Cas. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 934 F.2d 695, 702 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that it was not necessary for the court to determine if the requirements of common law
fraud had been met because in a case of fraud in the transaction one must only show intentional
fraud).
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A review of the literature establishes that the major policy justifications
for the fraud exception are four-fold, but interrelated: (1) a total disdain for
letting a fraudster obtain funds from the issuer; (2) concern that fraudulent
payments under the credit will diminish the viability of the letter of credit in
commercial transactions; (3) possible financial difficulties for the applicant;
and (4) fraudulent payments by an issuer could diminish the reputation of the
issuer. While there is clearly a public interest in protecting the applicant and
the issuer from a beneficiary's fraud, this interest should be balanced with
the commercial and financial interest in maintaining the issuer's independent
obligation under the credit. This Article will now undertake to briefly
evaluate these policy justifications that tether the fraud inquiry to limit the
independence principle and then will propose new and different ways to
achieve these policy objectives without reliance on the fraud exception.
Some commentators assert that there is a loophole in letters of credit
law. 141 The loophole arises as a function of the operation of the independence
principle as an absolute assurance of payment to a beneficiary upon
presentation of conforming documents.14 2 Thus, under the independence
principle, a beneficiary who knowingly presents fraudulent documents that
strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the credit or fails to perform
his underlying contractual obligations will be paid by the issuer. These
commentators argue that the fraud exception is the way to close that loophole
by authorizing a court to go beyond the documents presented to ascertain
whether there is any material fraud in the documents or the underlying
141 See, e.g., Buckley & Gao, supra note 4, at 664-65 (stating that "[t]he separation in law of
the documents from the actual performance of the underlying transaction is absolutely necessary for
credits to fulfill their essential commercial function and creates a loophole for unscrupulous
beneficiaries to abuse the system"); Gao, supra note 41, at 56 (arguing that since all a beneficiary
has to do was produce facial compliant documents there was a loophole for the unscrupulous to
defraud others).
1
42 The Canadian Supreme Court expressed the obvious dilemma created by the fraud exception
as follows:
The potential scope of the fraud exception must not be a means of creating serious
uncertainty and lack of confidence in the operation of letter of credit transactions; at the
same time the application of the principle of autonomy must not serve to encourage or
facilitate fraud in such transactions.
Bank of Nov Scotia v. Angelica-Whitwear Ltd., D.L.R. 161, 168 (Can. 1987).
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transaction. 14 3 Underlying this approach is the general public policy of
discouraging fraud.1" In that regard one federal judge has noted that "there
is as much public interest in discouraging fraud as in encouraging letters of
credit."1 4 5 This argument is reinforced by the dictum in the Sztejn case where
the court stated that the independence principle "presupposes that the
presented documents accompanying the draft are genuine and conform in
terms to the requirements of the letter of credit."'" One commentator
expressed it as follows:
The certainty of payment of a letter of credit is crucial for
those who, as beneficiaries, supply money, goods or services
to applicants .. . Yet what about the applicant? To leave the
applicant without a remedy against fraud would equally
frustrate the applicant's expectations of the letter of credit.
After all, why should a good faith applicant agree to procure
the issuance of a letter of credit and reimburse the issuing
bank if the letter of credit becomes an automatic and
unstoppable vehicle for the perpetration of fraud?147
There is also a policy argument that the fraud exception maintains the
utility of letters of credit.14 8 This argument seeks to justify protection of both
the applicant and the issuer in the transaction based on the assertion that
"See, e.g., Buckley & Gao, supra note 4, at 664 (stating that the fraud rule allowed the court
to go beyond the presented documents and to enjoin payment when fraud was involved); Gao, supra
note 41, at 56 (stating that the fraud rule allowed courts to go behind the documents and interfere
with payment under the credit).
"See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 4, at 502 (preventing "fraud is legitimate commercial policy,
and courts are justifiably concerning that they not fashion law contributing to fraudulent practices");
Buckley & Gao, supra note 4, at 665 (arguing that the fraud rule "fills a gap in the law of letters of
credit and a public policy requirement.").
1
45See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 1000 (N.D. Ga.
1973).
14631 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (N.Y. Special Term 1941). The court continued by stating that the
independence principle should not be "extended to protect the unscrupulous seller." Id. See also
O'Meara Co. v. Nat'l Park Bank of N.Y., 239 N.Y. 386, 401 (1925) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)
(arguing that if the bank knew that the documents presented were false, the bank should not be
forced to make payment).
147O Kozolchyk, The Immunization ofFraudulently Procured Letter ofCredit Acceptances:
All Services Exportacao, Importacao Comercio, S.A. v. Banco Bamerindus do Brazil, S.A. and First
Commercial v. Gotham Originals, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 369, 370 (1992).
'3See, e.g., Buckley & Gao, supra note 4, at 666.
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continued use of the letter of credit is dependent upon the faith of the users.
If there were no fraud exception to the independence principle, this argument
asserts that faith in the system of letters of credit would fail and so would the
commercial utility of its use.14 9 One commentator noted that a legal regime
that did not have a fraud exception:
[E]ntails deterrence of potential customer from entering into
letter-of-credit transactions. Customers would fear that
having paid for nonconforming or worthless goods (in
commercial transactions) or that having paid in
circumstances in which within the context of the underlying
contract, payment was clearly unjustified, their subsequent
claim and enforcement proceedings against the beneficiary
parties to the transaction would prove to be futile." 0
Furthermore, this policy argument also focuses on protection of the
issuer. As noted earlier, the issuer and the applicant execute a reimbursement
agreement under which terms the applicant is required to reimburse the issuer
for its payment to the beneficiary under the letter of credit.151 In the case of a
commercial letter of credit, not only is the issuer concerned with the credit
worthiness of the applicant and the value of any possible security posted by
the applicant to secure the letter of credit, but the issuer might also be
interested in the validity of the bills of lading which will be tendered by the
1
4 9See id. at 667. See also Symons, supra note 82, at 379-80 (stating that the fraud exception
"would not destroy the commercial utility letters of credit because it serves no commercial purpose
to provide certainty of payment to one who has intentionally deceived other parties to a transaction."
(emphasis in original)). But see Henry Harfield, Code, Customs and Conscience in Letter-of-Credit
Law, 4 UCC L.J. 7, 11, 14 (1971) (stating that "I fear that the sacred cow of equity may trample the
tender vines of letter-of-credit law. ... The right to enforce express terms, without reference to
equities, has long been recognized in letter-of-credit law, and is essential to the proper functioning
of the letter-of-credit device.").
I 5oMautner, supra note 17, at 599. See also Kozolchyk, supra note 146, at 370 (arguing that
applicants would be reluctant to use letters of credit "if the letter of credit becomes and automatic
and unstoppable vehicle for the perpetration of fraud.").
151 The contractual obligation to reimburse can create financial hardship for the applicant. In
the case of a commercial credit where no merchandise was delivered, unless he can recoup the funds
paid by the issuer to the beneficiary in subsequent breach of contract litigation, he is in danger of
being out both the amount of the purchase price for the goods and the value of the merchandise. A
similar problem faces the applicant of a standby credit. Unless subsequent litigation is successful,
he is out the amount of the payment made under the letter of credit.
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beneficiary along with the draft.'52 Without a fraud exception, one
commentator posited that banks might worry that the merchandise which
would act as additional collateral might be worthless, and fearing this might
require additional security from the applicant such that the applicant might
have fewer assets available to fund other transactions. 153 Of course this fear
of the issuer can be partially alleviated by requiring verified inspection
certificates as a term and condition of the letter of credit; furthermore, this
worry does not exist under standby credits as there is no merchandise that
can act as security for the issuer.
In response to these policy arguments in favor of the fraud exception it
should first be noted that the applicant is not left without a remedy against
fraud if there were no fraud exception. In the situation of a commercial letter
of credit involving the sale of goods he could sue the beneficiary for breach
of its underlying contractual obligation.154 Furthermore, to prevent litigation
in a distant or even foreign jurisdiction, the prudent and careful purchaser
should consider inserting a forum selection clause and a choice of law
provision in the underlying sales contract. He should also have the contract
require commercial arbitration in a specific designated location to resolve
any contractual disputes.'5 Additionally, the purchaser should contractually
152This fact was noted in the Sztejn case in the following language:
While the primary factor in the issuance of the letter of credit is the credit standing of the
buyer, the security afforded by the merchandise is also taken into account. In fact, the
letter of credit requires a bill of lading made out to the order of the bank and not the
buyer. Although the bank is not interested in the exact detailed performance of the sales
contract, it is vitally interested in assuring itself that there are some goods represented by
the documents.
Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 635 (N.Y. Special Term 1941).
"'See Mautner, supra note 17, at 603-05 (arguing that such a result would be economically
inefficient).
'54Some commentators assert that this potential recovery from the beneficiary is illusory. See
Buckley & Gao, supra note 4, at 666 (noting that in most cases the fraudster absconds before the
fraud or forgery was discovered) (footnote omitted). See also Mautner, supra note 17, at 595-97
(arguing that if the applicant's later claims against the beneficiary prove futile, the standing of legal
institutions would be prejudiced, there would be a deterrence in the use of letters of credit, and banks
would need to obtain additional assurances from an applicant before issuing a letter of credit).
'55See, e.g., SI. Strong, Beyond International Commercial Arbitration? The Promise of
International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH. U. J. & POL'Y 11, 11 (2014) (stating that
"[i]nternational commercial arbitration has long been the preferred means of resolving complex
business disputes in the cross-border context." (footnote omitted)). The author notes that some
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require not only a certification by an independent bonded entity as to the
quality and existence of the merchandise being shipped,'56 but also should
require an on-board negotiable bill of lading establishing that the
merchandise is on a carrier.1 7
people prefer international commercial arbitration due to the easy in enforcing such awards. Id. at
27-28 (citing the various treaties and other mechanism for recognition of such awards and their
enforcement).
'6See, e.g., ACR Sys., Inc. v. Woori Bank, 232 F. Supp. 3d 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (noting
that the letter of credit required in addition to the bills of lading and the commercial invoice an
inspection certificate from the person receiving the goods for shipping).
.'. For export of merchandise from the United States, there are two main statutes that
govern bills of lading. First, there is the CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT OF 1936, Pub. L. No.
521, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30701-30707 (2006)
(noting in Section 30702 that it applies to the carriage of goods to or from any port in the United
States); and there is Article 7 of the U.C.C. See, e.g., WHITE ET AL., supra note 23, at¶ 29:2, p. 392
(citations omitted). See also POMERENE ACT, Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 415, 39 Stat. 538 (1916) (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 80101-80116 (2006) (noting in Section 80102 that by its terms it does
not apply to transportation of goods from a place in a foreign county and to a place in the United
States).
For the purpose of this Article, it is important to note that a negotiable bill of lading acts as a
receipt of the merchandise by the carrier, is a contract for carriage between the seller (or its agent)
and the carrier, but most import in a commercial letter of credit transaction, it is a document of title
that controls the possession of the goods. These three characteristics of the bill of lading were
succinctly stated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals as follows:
[A] negotiable or order bill of lading is a fundamental and vital pillar of international
trade and commerce, indispensable to the conduct and financing of business involving
the sale and transportation of goods between parties located at a distance from one
another. It constitutes an acknowledgement by a carrier that it has received the described
goods for shipment. It is also a contract of carriage. As a document of title it controls the
possession of the goods themselves. It has been said that the bill and the goods become
one and the same, with the goods being "locked up in the bill."
Berisford Metals, Corp. v. S/S Salvador, 779 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1985). Under a documentary
letter of credit transaction, the negotiable bill of lading will be one of the documents that need to be
presented to the issuer for payment. The U.C.C. provides that a bill of lading "is negotiable if by its
terms the goods are to be delivered to bearer or to the order of a named person." U.C.C. § 7-104(a).
The negotiable bill of lading is issued by the carrier to the order of the beneficiary upon delivery of
the merchandise for shipping. The beneficiary will endorse the bill to the issuer who will then be
the holder of the bill. The issuer will endorse the bill over to the applicant upon reimbursement.
With the bill of lading, the applicant can then receive the merchandise from the carrier by delivering
the bill of lading to the carrier in exchange for the goods. See id. § 7-502(a)(4).
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In addition, in both the commercial credit and the standby credit the
applicant can take steps to protect himself from the risks of potential fraud in
the first place, by using due diligence in initially selecting and evaluating the
reputation and financial status of the other party. In the case of the standby
letter of credit, a prudent businessman should never enter into a contractual
relationship that authorizes a clean letter of credit where the beneficiary
merely presents a draft to the issuer and no other documentation.58 Such
circumstances invite fraud. The underlying contract and the standby letter of
credit should each specifically require the presentment of at least a certified
letter stating each act of omission or commission by the applicant that
constitutes a breach of the underlying contract with specific reference to the
underlying contract's provisions. The underlying contract should require
notice of any alleged breach with enough time to cure prior to drawing on the
letter of credit. In many situations, especially in those cases involving
contracts with foreign entities requiring a clean standby letter of credit
securitizing a performance bond that is payable upon receiving a letter that
the applicant is in breach of the underlying contract, the applicant may not
have the bargaining power to negotiate favorable terms. However, in these
situations, it should be the applicant who was willing to enter into an
arrangement fraught with problems, likely for substantial financial reward,
that should shoulder the entire economic losses or litigation time or expense,
not the issuer.
The various arguments in favor of the fraud exception fail to fully address
the impact that it has on the independence principle. The true concern from a
policy standpoint must be centered on preventing a fraudulent party from
benefiting from his illicit activity. However, the fraud exception is merely
one avenue to achieve this fundamental policy goal. A better solution would
be to focus on how to achieve this policy while freeing the independence
principle from its tether. This approach involves a totally new paradigm, one
that does not focus on the fraudster but focuses upon the two different
inquiries. First, who in a letter of credit transaction should bear the risk of
fraud and its resultant potential economic loss?'59 Secondly, who in the letter
"'See id. § 5-109, cmt. 3 (defining a clean letter of credit as "one calling only for a draft and
no other documents"). See also MCCULLOUGH, supra note 47, at 93 (defining a clean letter of credit
as "[a] letter of credit which only requires presentation of a draft or demand for payment, and no
other documents.").
'Both before and after the Revised Article 5 one of the leading scholars of the U.C.C. asserted
that the extension of the fraud exception beyond the credit transaction itself would destroy the credit
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of credit transaction is in the best position to reduce the incidence of fraud?
The answer to both questions is the applicant. While the author agrees that
society should not condone fraudulent activity, the proper way to achieve this
in letters of credit law is to force the applicant to adequately protect itself
from the potentially fraudulent activities of the beneficiary. By placing the
risk of fraud totally on the applicant, the tether to the independence principle
will be abolished and the issuer and the honest beneficiary will be freed from
wasteful and time-consuming litigation when an applicant attempts to delay
or even prevent the beneficiary from payment under the credit. 1o
The fraud exception had a ring of appeal at a time when international sales
transactions or other contractual undertakings were undertaken in a virtual
vacuum. 161 When a merchant in New York was selling goods to a merchant
in Berlin fifty years ago (or even 20 years ago) or at the same time a
contractor was contracting to do construction in a foreign country there were
few, if any, avenues for either party to develop sufficient information
concerning the credit worthiness or the reputation for honesty and good faith
of the other party. However, in today's world there are adequate means to
determine these matters. We live in a truly digital world with a free flow of
vital commercial information. Furthermore, in the area of commercial letters
there are numerous, respected international inspection agencies to verify that
the contract merchandise is being shipped and is not rubbish.16 2
VII. RECEPTION BY THE COURTS OF THE REVISED FRAUD PROVISION
IN ARTICLE 5 OF THE U.C.C.
As noted earlier, although the Revised Article 5-109 and the comments
to that section provide examples of the application of fraud in the documents
devise and makes it the equivalent of a performance bond. See Dolan, supra note 19, at 13. Twenty
years later Professor Dolan acknowledged that his efforts to limit the fraud exception to only the
letter of credit transaction had been largely unsuccessful. See Dolan, supra note 4, at 488 (stating
that the efforts to limit the fraud exception "have been largely unsuccessful").
1"See Mautner, supra note 17, at 599 (noting that the fraud exception creates fear in
beneficiaries knowing that an applicant can seeking to delay or prevent honoring ofa presentation).
161 Dolan, supra note 19, at 11 (1985) (noting that allegation of fraud in the underlying
transaction or in the credit transaction give courts pause).
162 See, e.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 0988
(JSR), 2011 WL 855936, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (noting that the letter of credit required a
lab report certifying the quality of the merchandise made by SGS "an international quality
inspection company").
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and cite cases which the drafters believed would give enough guidelines as
to the standard of material fraud necessary to qualify for injunctive relief, the
mere existence of the fraud exception gives hope (perhaps even false hope)
to applicants who desire to prevent issuers from honoring a presentation. 163
Thus, the courts are often called to intervene in mere underlying contractual
disputes,164or in cases where an applicant attempts to extricate itself from a
bad economic or business decision.16 5 This continued litigation involving the
issuer is not justified in a true economic time and cost sense, and there is need
to abolish the fraud exception to letters of credit. The abolition of this
exception would send a clear message to contracting parties that they should
more carefully evaluate their risks before entering into an underlying contract
requiring a letter of credit. The fraud exception is wreaking havoc on the
independence of commercial obligations by placing financial institutions in
the middle of disputes between applicants and beneficiaries. While, arguably,
the fraud exception seeks to do what is thought to be fair, the result is to
change an independent obligation of "pay now, argue later" into a totally
dependent conditional obligation of "argue now, pay later."l6 6
61See supra Section V.
"See, eg., Langley v. Prudential Mortg. Capital Co., 546 F.3d 365, 368-69 (6th Cir. 2008)
(dissolving a trial court's granting of a temporary injunction for incorrectly invalidating a forum
selection clause), reh'g denied, 554 F.3d 647, 649-50 (Moore, J., concurring) (noting that the
temporary injunction was invalidated also for finding probably fraud in the transaction when this
was really merely a contractual dispute); Hook Point, LLC v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 725 S.E.2d
681, 685-86 (2012) (stating that the an argument that the commitment letter limited the utilization
of the LC was a mere contract dispute); Lennar Homes, LLC v. V Ventures, LLC, 988 So. 2d 660,
662-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming a denial ofan injunction to enjoin payment on a letter
of credit for failing to demonstrate fraud in the draw request for this was merely a question of breach
an option agreement dispute).
65See, e.g., 3M Co. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 16 Civ. 5984 (PGG), 2018 WL 1989563,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2018) (seeking an injunction to prevent payment of a clean letter of credit
in a construction job in Turkey); 2002 Irrevocable Trust for Richard C. Hvizdak v. Shenzhen Dev.
Bank, Co., Ltd, No. 2:08-cv-556-FtM-36DNF, 2011 WL 4112776, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2011),
aff'd 2002 Irrevocable Trust for Richard Hvizdak v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 515 Fed. App'x 792
(11th Cir. 2013) (seeking injunctive relief to prevent payment when a sales contract for a boat
purchase was breached).
'6See Eakin v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 875 F.2d 114, 116 (7th Cir. 1989)
(stating that "[1]etters of credit are designed to avoid complex disputes about how much the
beneficiaries 'really' owe"). See also Dolan, supra note 4, at 502 (noting that the courts need to
resist efforts to reorder the transaction "ex post from a pay-now-argue-later egime to a argue-now-
pay-later regime" and also stating the applicant should seek his remedy against the beneficiary
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This Section of this Article analyzes four cases that exemplify how the
fraud exception seriously impairs the independence principle as an efficient
commercial device. While the U.C.C. provides high requirements that must
be satisfied in order to obtain injunctive relief,6 7 these cases establish that a
better solution would be for the applicants to be more diligent in the
underlying transaction and to let the issuers play the role that they bargained
for-honoring presentations that strictly comply with the terms and
conditions of the letter of credit. There is absolutely no reason for issuers to
be involved in litigation that is totally inefficient and time consuming. 16 8 In
analyzing these cases, it will be necessary to investigate the underlying facts
in somewhat tedious detail in order to effectively evaluate how and why the
transaction ended up in the courts in the first place and to highlight what the
where he must pay the costs and assume the risks he undertook when it asked the bank to issue the
independent obligation).
167See U.C.C. § 5-109(b), cmt. 4 (stating that the standard for injunctive relief is high).
'"One of the more significant early cases involving the Revised U.C.C. fraud exception spent
nearly three years in the courts before a permanent injunction entered by the trial court, reversed by
the appellate court, was finally reinstated by the Ohio Supreme Court. See Mid-America Tire, Inc.
v. PTZ Trading Ltd., 1999 WL 34828690 (Ohio Com. Pl. Oct. 08, 1999), rev'd in part and vacated
in part, 2000 WL 1725415 (Ohio App. Nov. 20, 2000), rev'd, 768 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio 2002) (noting
that the beneficiary induced applicant to obtain a letter of credit for the purchase of winter tires that
could not be imported legally by materially false representations with respect to both importability
and the availability of more lucrative summer tires). This is a classic case of businessmen so
intrigued with the prospect of obtaining Michelin tires at a steep discount for resale at a normal
retail price. Instead of trying to protect themselves when they enter into a contract with an unknown
seller, they run to the court for assistance when the "too good to be true deal" sours and they are left
holding the bag. This is a prime reason that the fraud exception, at least in the case of commercial
letters of credit, should be abolished. It encourages lack of due diligence on buyers knowing that
they might be able to escape a transaction after the fact.
The risks of a sale can be allocated between the parties to the underlying sales transaction by
have it in writing, checking the references of the parties involved (perhaps having references given),
checking the financial status of the seller to insure no chance of insolvency, having an independent
inspection of the goods to ensure quality, and requiring a clean bill of lading. All of these things are
possible today given the digital age and the ease of obtaining financial information through
corresponding banks and the internet. See Rocco D'Ascenzo, The Supreme Court of Ohio's
Decision in Mid-American Tire, Inc. v. PTZ Trading Ltd., and the Weakening of the Independence
Principle, 32 CAP. U. L. REv. 1097, 1121-25 (2004) (listing things that the purchaser's attorney
could have done to protect his client without seeking court intervention).
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applicants should have done to prevent the problem in the first place and to
save the issuers and the courts time and money. 169
Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. is the first
case.170 The case involved the sale of rice by a subsidiary of Archer Daniels
Midland Co (ADM Rice) to the Grain Board of Iraq (GBI), an entity under
the supervision of the Iraqi Government's Ministry of Trade.'7 1 Under the
arrangement of the parties, ADM Rice was to post a performance bond
through an Iraqi Bank to guaranty the quality of the rice or wheat.172 ADM
Rice applied for a letter of credit with JP Morgan Chase (Chase) which was
contingent on an Iraqi bank issuing a performance bond to GBI guarantying
ADM Rice's performance of the sales contract.173 The letter of credit was
subsequently issued with ADM as the account holder and TBI (an Iraqi
bank), another Iraqi governmental entity, as beneficiary.174 The letter of
credit provided in part that TBI could draw on the letter when it had received
a claim in accordance with the terms of the performance bond which was
issued by TBI shortly after the issuance of the letter of credit. 175 The letter
of credit incorporated the terms of the performance bond which specifically
provided that all claims made under the bond must be "accompanied by an
SGS original laboratory report specifically certifying that the quality of
purchased commodity does not meet the contractual specifications."7 6
However, the letter of credit only required that GBI provide TBI with the
'69The issuer may be able to recover its reasonable attorney's fees and litigation expenses if it
is a prevailing party in an action under Article 5. See U.C.C. § 5-111(e), cmt. 6 (noting that while
the issuer may be entitled to such fees and expenses pursuant to its reimbursement agreement with
the applicant "allowing the issuer to recover those fees from a losing beneficiary may also protect
the applicant against undeserved losses."). Notwithstanding the recovery of such fees, the issuer has
additional economic losses derived from the fraud litigation, including time and effort spent in
preparing and participating in the trial.





"'ld. at *2. The letter of credit provided, "[Funds are] ... available against your authenticated
Swift/Tested Telex that you have duly issued your Performance Bond as requested by ourselves and
that you have received a claim in accordance with the terms of the performance bond." Id.
761d. at *2 (stating that the SGS was "an international quality inspection company").
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SGS report, but did not require that a copy of that report be presented to
Chase in order to request payment under the letter of credit. 7
The parties had done numerous other transactions.'78 In some of these
other transactions there had been grain quality issues which were resolved
informally with ADM Rice agreeing to satisfy all claims without a request
under the performance bond.179 However, this time there was a call on the
performance bond and then a subsequent demand for payment under the
standby letter of credit.180 ADM filed suit seeking a temporary restraining
order to prevent Chase from honoring the draw by TBI alleging that there
was fraud as no adverse quality report had been issued by SGS.18' Following
a hearing on the preliminary injunction, the court determined that there was
no "plausible or colorable basis under the contract for TBI's request for
payment under the letter of credit" as there was no adverse quality report
issued by SGS and that TBI's representation to Chase was "almost certainly
false."l82 The court noted that TBI had complied with the terms and
conditions under the letter of credit, but that fraud in the transaction
constitutes a "well established exception" to the independence principle.183
Thus, the court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Chase from
honoring the presentation.'8
This case is a prime example of a lack of diligence by the applicant. While
4.4 million tons of grain had previously been shipped by ADM Rice without
any problems, it unwisely failed to adequately protect itself by making the
letter of credit specify that one of the documents that needed to be presented
to Chase under the terms of the letter of credit was the SGS certificate
showing that the grain was not up to contract specifications. The injunction
in the face of fraud in the transaction was used against a bad faith party to




179Id. (stating that ADM Rice had sold extensive amounts of grain commodities through GBI
since 2005).
801d. (stating that the draw was for the sum of $6,926,850).
' Id. at *3.
182Id. at *6 (concluding that "the most reasonable interpretation of the relevant circumstances
is the TB l's request was made in an attempt to effectuate a fraud").
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this litigation with the bank? Why should the independence principle be
corroded due to the failure of an applicant to use due diligence in a
commercial sales transaction? Why not let the parties protect themselves or
suffer the consequences?1 86 This was a sale for $69 million and involved
almost a $7 million clean letter of credit. ADM Rice could have protected
itself, but it apparently let down its shield because of the success of other
earlier transactions.18 While successful in obtaining the injunction, all this
time and expense could have been avoided by careful drafting and diligently
being aware of the changing political realties in Iraq.
3M Company v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. is the second case.8 8 The case
involved an Electronic Toll Collection System project in Turkey for PTT, a
subdivision of the Turkish Government.189 Vendeka was the prime contractor
on the job and 3M was a subcontractor.190 Under the terms of the subcontract,
3M was to obtain a letter of credit to guarantee Vendeka's performance under
its contract with PTT. 9'
The letter of credit that was issued was in favor of a Ziraat Bank (a
Turkish bank) and provided that Ziraat Bank would issue a "guarantee"
(letter of credit) to Aktif Bank (another Turkish bank), and that Ziraat Bank
would request that Aktif Bank issue its local guarantee (letter of credit) in
favor of the PTT.19 2 The letter of credit obtained by 3M from HSBC recited
"t6See, e.g., WHITE ET AL., supra note23, at¶ 26:38, p. 250 (6th ed. 2014) (positing that "Archer
must have kicked itself for failing to make the presentation of a negative SGS report as part of the
presentation on the letter of credit.").
187It is unclear from the case when the other successful transactions had occurred, but the
contract for this sale was completed after the last allied combat troops had left Iraqi and entered
Kuwait-August 18,2010. See Jane Arraf, Iraq War: Last US Combat Brigade Crosses into Kuwait,
TI-LE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2010/0819/Iraq-war-Last-US-combat-brigade-crosses-into-Kuwait As conditions were
changing in Iraqi, perhaps more diligence should have been undertaken by a large conglomerate
with world-wide connections.




1Id. at *1-2. 3M acquired the rights and duties of the original subcontract as a result of an
asset purchase agreement whereby the original subcontractor assigned the subcontract ("Service




92Id. at *4 (noting that this was a three-bank structure whereby HSBC would issue its standby
letter of credit in favor of Ziraat Bank which would issue its letter of credit to Aktif Bank which
would issue a local guarantee to PTT).
2019] 407
BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
that its purpose was to guarantee the general contractor's "delivery of the toll
road equipment and systems specified" in a provision of the agreement
between the 3M and the general contractor.19 3 The original letter of credit
provided that Ziraat Bank could only draw on the letter of credit if a demand
for payment was made according to the terms of its letter of credit issued to
Aktif Bank and that such demand was due to 3M's responsibilities under its
contract with the general contractor.194 However, the letter of credit was
amended at the request of Ziraat Bank, as a requirement by Aktif Bank before
it would issue its local guarantee to PTT.1 95 3M approved the amendment hat
deleted any reference to the condition set forth in the original letter of credit
stating that the demand was a result of the 3M's failing to perform under its
contract.196
The Amended HSBC Letter of Credit provided that payment to Ziraat
Bank would be due once HSBC received Ziraat Bank's "written demand via
authenticated SWIFT," such demand being supported by a "written statement
[from Ziraat Bank] certifying that [Ziraat Bank] ha[s] received a demand for
payment under [the letter of credit Ziraat Bank issued in favor of Aktif Bank]
in accordance with [that letter of credit's] terms."'
A demand was subsequently made on the letter of credit issued by HSBC
with documents that facially conformed to the letter of credit's drawing
requirements.'9 8 3M sought an injunction claiming fraud in the transaction.199
But the court noted that the letter of credit was clean, requiring only a demand
and written statement from the Ziaart Bank that it had received a demand for
193id.
'"Ziraat Bank could draw on the letter of credit if it made a demand for payment "supported
by [a] written statement certifying that [it had] received a demand for payment . . . in accordance
with [the] terms [of the letter of credit it had issued to Aktif Bank] and that such demand is due to
Federal Signals Technologies['] responsibility under Section 4.2 of the Service Agreement." Id. 3M
had purchased all the assets of Federal Signals Technologies and was the assignee of the Service







'9Id. at *6 (claiming that not only was PTT demand for payment on Aktif Bank's letter of
credit fraudulent, but also alleging that Ziraat Bank was a direct participant in the fraudulent
transaction as it had refused to provide HSBC documents that it had requested including
documentation of its letter of credit in favor of Aktif Bank and ofthe demand made by that bank on
Ziraat Bank).
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payment under the amended letter of credit in accordance with the letter of
credit's terms.20 3M alleged that the refusal of Ziraat Bank to provide
documentation concerning Aktif Bank's demand on Ziraat Bank and of the
letter of credit in favor of Aktif Bank was circumstantial evidence of fraud. 201
However, the court noted that the amended letter of credit in favor of Ziraat
Bank did not require this documentation.2 0 2 The trial court found 3M had
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its claims of fraud by Ziraat
Bank and denied the application for a preliminary injunction.203
3M was a multinational corporation with extensive business acumen.
Why would it agree to a clean letter of credit which only required a letter
stating that Ziraat Bank had received a demand for it to pay on its guarantee?
Why would it agree to the amending of the letter of credit deleting that the
demand on the credit had to be based on 3M's breach of the contract with the
contractor? When that request was made, red flags should have gone up.
However, apparently this was a lucrative contract which 3M wanted as
reflected by the assignment of that contract in the asset purchase agreement
with the original subcontractor. In allowing the amendment of the letter of
credit it had applied for, 3M opened the door for the problems it got itself
into-another too good deal that went sour. Even the court noted that 3M
created its own problem in the following language:
3M's agreement to Ziraat Bank's proposed amendment to
the HSBC Letter of Credit-which removed the reference to
Section 4.2 of the Service Agreement-left it vulnerable,
because the letter of credit it was providing was no longer
2
0oId. at *10. The court noted that the Official Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 5-109 says that courts
should be skeptical of claims of fraud involving clean letters of credit. Id. (noting that the letter of
credit in this case was a clean one).
201 at * .
2
02Id. In a footnote that accompanied this statement by the court, the court noted that the
demand by the Ziraat Bank was in conformity with the terms of the letter of credit and that 3M "has
not shown that HSBC has a legal duty to conduct any further investigation." Id. at *11 n.12. This
statement by the court upholds the true independence of the letter of credit. See also Hook Point,
LLC v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 725 S.E.2d 681, 685 (S.C. 2012) (refusing to consider a loan
commitment agreement that stated when a letter of credit could be drawn because the plain language
of the letter of credit authorized a draw upon presentation of only a draft, the original letter of credit,
and a notarized statement that borrower was in default of the loan agreement).
2033M Co., 2018 WL 1989563, at *13. The court also rejected 3M's assertion that alleged fraud
committed by PTT could be imputed to Ziraat Bank. Id. at *11-12 (noting that 3M's own evidence
presented a non-fraudulent explanation for PTT's draw on Aktif Bank).
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tethered to its own performance. Under the Service
Agreement with Vendeka, 3M was only obligated to post a
letter of credit in favor of Vendeka to guarantee 3M's
performance as subcontractor. But by consenting to the
amendment of the HSBC Letter of Credit, 3M permitted the
reference to these drawing conditions-tied to 3M's own
performance in connection with the HGS Project-to be
eliminated. 3M thereby left itself unprotected with respect to
a drawdown by PTT on the Aktif Bank letter of credit, which
in turn provoked Ziraat Bank's drawdown on the Amended
HSBC Letter of Credit.20
Due diligence could have prevented this dilemma, but alas, dragging
HSBC into the court to get relief that it could have prevented is not productive
or economically efficient. The use of the fraud exception to the independence
principle was misused. The applicant chose to permit the amendment o the
letter of credit.205 That was clearly a business mistake. Since the applicant
made the mistake, it should pay the cost of its decision and not commerce in
general. Anyone who contractually agrees to a clean letter of credit should
not involve issuers in subsequent litigation.
Two other recent cases show a complete lack of diligence and
investigation by purchasers who, when the underlying contract was breached,
alleged fraud seeking to prevent the honoring of letters of credit. Both cases
involve individuals interested in purchasing expensive luxury yachts from a
Chinese boat manufacturer. In 2002 Irrevocable Trust for Richard C
Hvizdak v. Shenzhen Dev. Bank Co., the 2002 Irrevocable Trust for Hvizdak
("Trust") entered into a written contract for the purchase of two custom 127-
foot yachts with Foshan Poly Marine Engineering, Co. ("Foshan") on August
19, 2 004.206 Under the terms of the contract, the Trust was to provide a
financial commitment for the construction of the two yachts by having two
$2.5 million standby letters of credit issued by a Florida bank ("Bank") with
Shenzhen Development Bank ("Shenzhen") as beneficiary.207 Shenzhen was
204Id. at *12.
205 Id. at *5.
206No. 2:08-CV-556-FtM-36DNF, 2010 WL 11512368, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2010), affd
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the beneficiary under the credits to secure its $5 million loan to Foshan.208
The sales contract also obligated Foshan to post two $6.5 million
performance bonds.2 09 Those bonds were never posted,210 and in January 5,
2005 the Trust cancelled the contracts for the boat construction and the next
day sought cancellation of the letters of credit, but the Shenzhen refused to
do so.21'
Over three years later, on the expiry date of the letter of credit, Shenzhen
made a draw request stating that the amount of the draw represented the
outstanding indebtedness owed Shenzhen by Foshan.2 12 Litigation
followed.213 The Trust originally sought an injunction to prevent the issuer
from honoring the draw,2 14 and it subsequently amended its suit to allege four
claims against Shenzhen and others.2 15 The Trust's amended pleadings did
not replead for injunctive relief2 16 but asserted "letter of credit fraud" under
U.C.C. § 5-109.217
2087d. at *5 (stating that loan amount was the amount requested by Foshan to construct the two




2101d. (noting that the Trust was never given assurances that the bonds would be posted from
Peter Tsou, President of Custom Marine International, who had been the individual who had initially
informed the Trust of Foshan).
2 11
id.
212Id. The applicant had filed a complaint against the Bank, Shenzhen, and Foshan six days




214Id. The documents that were presented were in strict compliance with the terms of the letter
of credit. Id. at *5.
2 15 Id at *.
216 Prior to filing its amended pleadings, the parties settled the issue relating to injunctive relief.
See 2002 Irrevocable Tr. for Richard C. Hvizdak v. Shenzhen Dev. Bank, Co., No. 2:08-cv-556-
FtM-36DNF, 2011 WL 4112776, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2011), affd sub nom. 2002 Irrevocable
Tr. for Richard C. Hvizdak v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 515 F. App'x 792 (11th Cir. 2013).
217 In a subsequent suit by Shenzhen to recover attorney's fees and expenses under U.C.C § 5-
111(e), the appellate court held that notwithstanding the fact that the Trust's amended complaint
did not seek injunctive relief, its theory of liability was under Section 5-109 and therefore, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in granting Shenzhen attorney's fee and expenses under the U.C.C.
See 2002 Irrevocable Tr. for Richard C. Hvizdak v. Huntington Na'l Bank, 515 F. App'x 792, 794
(11th Cir. 2013) (noting that although the Trust did not seek an injunction, its entire theory of
liability was letter of credit fraud as defined in Section 5-109). U.C.C. § 5-111(e) states:
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The case highlights several instances of a lack of diligence or inquiry on
the part of the Trust. The court concluded that while a letter of credit
transaction is supposedly between sophisticated parties who can and should
look after their own interests,2 18 the Trust failed to act as a sophisticated party
making a multimillion-dollar purchase. In this regard the court stated:
At oral argument, Plaintiffs also contended that, if Shenzhen
had not omitted that it was planning to make a loan and not
tie it directly to the two yachts and if it had not omitted that
the loan would be dispersed before the performance bonds
were issued, then Plaintiffs would not have carried out this
transaction. But, Plaintiffs effectuated the letter of credit
before the Foshan Poly Marine performance bonds were
issued. This was a volitional act that Plaintiffs took without
regard to the potential consequences. " . . . [E]very person
must use reasonable diligence for his own protection . . .
where the means of knowledge are at hand and are equally
available to both parties, and the subject matter is equally
open to their inspection, if one of them does not avail himself
of those means and opportunities, he will not be heard to say
that he was deceived by the other's misrepresentations."2 19
In this regard, the Trust claimed that Shenzhen was negligent in that it owed
a duty to the Trust to exercise reasonable care to see that the loans it made to
Foshan were earmarked for the building of the Trust's yachts as those loans
were secured by the letters of credit.2 20 The court noted that if the Trust
wanted Shenzhen to monitor the use of the loaned funds, the Trust could have
placed that requirement as one of the terms of the letter of credit. 221
"[r]easonable attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation must be awarded to the prevailing
party in an action which a remedy is sought under the article." U.C.C. § 5-111(e).
218Hvizdak, 2010 WL 11512368, at *2. (citing Buckley & Gao, supra note 4 at 308).
2 191d. at *6 (noting as there was no duty to disclose as there was no fiduciary duty between
Shenzhen and the Trust, thus the claim for negligent misrepresentation failed) (citing Potakar v.
Hurtak, 82 So.2d 502, 504 (Fla. 1955) which held a contract could not be rescinded because there
were not specific allegations demonstrating reasonable reliance).
22
0id
221The loan agreement between Shenzhen and Foshan explicitly stated that the loan proceeds
were to be used for the building of the two yachts, but such language was absent from the letters of
credit. Id at *6.
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To show the extent of desperation of the Trust's arguments seeking to
recover from Shenzhen for fraud and failure to disclose material facts, the
Trust alleged that Shenzhen had knowledge of Foshan's prior fraudulent
activities and failed to advise the Trust of these activities.222 In this regard,
the Trust cited a 2004 case involving Foshan filed in federal court in
Florida.223 In rejecting this argument the court noted:
There is no evidence in the record to suggest how Shenzhen,
a Chinese bank, could be expected to know or follow
lawsuits taking place . .. thousands of miles away from it,
when Shenzhen was not a party to the suit. The record
evidence established that Shenzhen approved the loan to
Foshan Poly Marine before service was obtained on any of
the defendants in the Seascape Yacht case, and thus could
not have disclosed information about the suit to Plaintiffs.224
Of course, the Trust should have sought legal advice. That advice would
have most likely included a recommendation of using a commercial letter of
credit authorizing payment upon delivery of the constructed boat, rather than
a standby letter of credit securitizing Shenzhen's loans to Foshan. Once
again, the facts of this case show a lack of diligence that leads to an applicant
running to the court in an attempt to escape from its original transaction.
While the standard for the application of the fraud rule is set high, abuse by
applicants has not dissipated. As deals in the commercial world can fall apart
in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons, applicants will be tempted
to use every means at their disposal to avoid the adverse consequences of a
sour deal. As long as there is a fraud exception, one of those means will be
running to the court to seek an injunction to delay or prevent the honoring of
the presentation. The effect of the fraud exception is to distract from the
commercial purpose of the letter of credit as a valid instrument in





2241d. at *4 (noting also that the case involved a predecessor entity distinct from Foshan Poly
Marine the entity involved in this case).
225To add insult upon insult (or perhaps to pour salt into the wound), Shenzhen obtained a
judgment for attorney's fees and expenses in the amount of $434,036.90 under the Florida
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The fourth and final case is another case involving Foshan Polymarine
Engineering Co. ("Foshan"). This case involved a contract for the purchase
of a $6,030,500.00 luxury motor yacht to be built in China.226 The purchaser
in this case (Jaffe) admitted that it wanted to buy the boat cheap from a
Chinese company and then "flip" it for a $3 million dollar profit.2 27 The sales
contract between Jaffe and Foshan required a standby letter of credit, and one
was initially issued by Bank of America ("BOA") for a small portion of the
sales price with Foshan as the beneficiary; however, the credit was
subsequently amended for the total amount of the sales price naming
Agricultural Bank of China ("ABC") as the beneficiary.228 The sales contract
equivalent to U.C.C. § 5-111(e). 2002 Irrevocable Tr. for Richard C. Hvizdak v. Huntington Nat'l
Bank, 515 F. App'x 792, 793 (11th Cir. 2013). See also supra note 217.
226See Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff'd 395 F.
App'x 583 (1lth Cir. 2010). The case started with the purchasers [Jaffe] seeking a temporary
restraining order and injunctive relief against Bank of America, N.A., [BOA] to enjoin it from
paying a letter of credit to either Foshan or the Agricultural Bank of China [ABC] claiming that the
presentment was fraudulent, and honor of the credit would facilitate a material fraud by the Foshan
upon Jaffe. Id. at 1304. Although not parties to the suit at the time of the hearing on the temporary
injunction, the court had previously ordered both ABC and Foshan to appear at the hearing as the
allegation in the complaint stated that these co-conspirators sought to fraudulently acquire funds
intended by Jaffe for the construction of the yacht. Id. at 1305 (noting that the two ignored the
court's order).
On May 4, 2007, the trial court entered its temporary injunction enjoining BOA from disbursing
funds under the letter of credit. Id. at 1306. The court entered the temporary injunction because of
the "uncontradicted proof of Plaintiff's [Jaffe] serious allegations of fraud." See Jaffe v. Bank of
Am., N.A., No. 07-21093-CIV, 2008 WL 623031, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2008). On June 1, 2007,
ABC filed a motion to intervene and to vacate the temporary injunction. Jaffe, 667 F. Supp. 2d at
1306. A week later, BOA filed its answer to the original petition, filed a counterclaim against the
Jaffe, and filed third party claims against ABC and Foshan seeking a declaration of rights among
the parties. Id. Jaffe then filed an amended complaint against BOA, ABC, and Foshan leveling major
complaints against BOA. Id. at 1307 (alleging that the bank had made misstatements and omissions
that amount to negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable estoppel). All
the claims against Foshan were dismissed for failure to obtain service. Id.
Following the trial court's refusal to vacate the preliminary injunction, ABC appealed, and the
court of appeals affirmed holding that the district court had not abused its discretion in continuing
the preliminary injunction. Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., 276 F. App'x 932, 933 (11th Cir. 2008).
The case was finally tried in 2009. Jaffe, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (noting the trial was during the
period June 29, 2009 through July 2, 2009). The trial court denied the permanent injunction and
vacated the preliminary injunction. Id. at 1323.
227Id. at 1309.
28See Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 07-21093-CIV, 2008 WL 11333769, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 10, 2008). The letter of credit naming ABC as beneficiary was to provide additional security
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also required Foshan to post a performance bond to guarantee construction
of the yacht and required Jaffe to increase the amount of the letter of credit
once the performance bond was issued.2 29 Although the boat was never
constructed, a demand for a draw on the letter of credit was made and
litigation ensued.230
The court's finding of facts following the trial23 1 established that Jaffe
was a successful and sophisticated businessman who owned several
automobile dealerships and had done more than $1 billion in loans during his
career.2 32 Jaffe refused to seek expert advice on undertaking this transaction
involving a standby letter of credit.233 Although he testified that he wanted a
"no boat, no money" stipulation in the letter of credit,234 the letter of credit
that he approved and signed did not contain that language.235 Furthermore,
under the sales contract, Jaffe had the right to have his own representative
present at all times during the construction of the yacht and to supervise the
building process, but he never exercised that right.236 As can be expected, the
for ABC to make a loan to finance the construction of the yacht by Foshan. See Jaffe v. Bank of
Am., N.A., 395 F. App'x 583, 585 (11th Cir. 2010).
229See Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 07-21093-CIV, 2008 WL 11333769, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 10, 2008) (noting that shortly after the performance bond was issued in the amount of
$6,100,000 that the letter of credit was increased from $350,000 to $6,030,500). The performance
bond was acquired from a company in August of 2004, and in October of 2004, Jaffe was notified
by the FBI that the bond was fraudulent. Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1317,
aff'd 395 F. App'x 583 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that although he had obtained and paid for the bond
which would have guaranteed payment to him in the event the yacht was not build, he did not advise
BOA that it was phony and worthless).
2301n October of 2004, Jaffe learned that the yacht was not being built and contacted BOA in
an attempt to cancel the credit but was told that "if ABC requested a draw on the letter of credit, it
would be paid." Id. Nearly three years later a draw was made on the letter of credit but was
unsuccessful as a preliminary injunction had been issued days before. See Jaffe v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., No. 07-21093-CIV, 2008 WL 11333769, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2008).
231See supra note 215 (citing to the various causes of action that were involved in the trial).
232 Jaffe v. Bank ofAm. N.A., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2009), affd 395 F. App'x
583 (11th Cir. 2010).
2331d. at 1316 (finding that Jaffe was advised by his lawyer after reviewing the letter of credit
that he had concerns about it and recommended to Jaffe to get an expert on banking instruments).
2341d. at 1316-17 (stating that the court doubted that Jaffe had ever told the bank officials that
he wanted a "no boat, no money" stipulation in the letter of credit and found that Jaffe did not tell
the bank officials to include the stipulation).
2351Id. at 1317.
2361d. at 1322.
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yacht was never built nor delivered, and ABC subsequently attempted to
make a draw on the standby letter of credit which was issued as collateral for
the loan that ABC had made to Foshan to build the yacht. 237
As the litigation rolled along, the temporary injunction was vacated238
the motion to stay/restore the injunction pending an appeal was denied2 39;
ABC got its payment under the letter of credit24 0; BOA was awarded
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $469,134.03241; and
ABC was awarded the $150,000 injunction bond that had been posted by
Jaffe in the action.242 Once again, we see what happens when a person enters
into a transaction that he is not fully competent to undertake and refuses to
get advice that would keep him out of the soup he ends up in after following
his own advice. In this case, the following events are telling about Jaffe's
inability to conduct this transaction on his own and lack of due diligence:
1. Jaffe approved the letter of credit language which did not
include the stipulation that the money would only be paid on
completion of the yacht. Of course, this could have easily
been a condition in a standard commercial letter of credit.243
2. Jaffe relied upon his own business acumen and refused to
seek expert advice on letters of credit, although he had been
237The amended letter of credit stated that BOA would pay ABC up to $6,030,500 upon
presentation of a certified statement stating that "[t]he amount of the draft drawn hereunder
represented and covers the unpaid balance of indebtedness including interest and bank charges, if
any, due to the beneficiary by FoShan Poly Marine Engineering Co. L.T.D." See Jaffe v. Bank of
Am., N.A., 395 F. App'x 583, 585 (11th Cir. 2010).
238Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff'd395 F. App'x
583 (11th Cir. 2010.)
2391d. at 1324.
240Id. at 1323-24 (holding that the preliminary injunction enjoining BOA from paying on the
letter of credit for over almost the last two years was vacated and the court denied the Jaffe's motion
to stay its order pending an appeal).
24 1 Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365-66 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff'd 399 F.
App'x 535 (11th Cir. 2010). The trial court awarded recovery for BOA under U.C.C. § 5-1ll (e)
and under the terms of the application for the letter of credit executed by Jaffe. Id. at 1363-65.
242 The bond posted by Jaffe on the issuance of the preliminary injunction was for "the payment
of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who was found wrongly
enjoined. Id. at 1366 (noting that while BOA was the party enjoined it was only ABC that opposed
the injunction and had requested the posting of the bond).
243Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310-11 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff'd 395 F.
App'x 583 (11th Cir. 2010).
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advised to seek such advice by an attorney that he retained
for a very limited purpose.244
3. Jaffe read, approved, and signed the letter of credit even
though it did not include his alleged requirement of "no boat,
no money."24 5
4. Jaffe was apparently not concerned about the overall
financial arrangements as he expect to sell his contract to
purchase the boat and make a 50% profit.246
5. Jaffe was on the line for over $6 million and only
protected himself by having Foshan have ABC issue a
$300,000 letter of credit as liquidated damages if the boat
was not built.247
Once again, we see that lack of due diligence creates a problem for a yacht
buyer. While not all risks can be eliminated in a letter of credit transaction,
there are ways individuals can protect themselves. In both yacht purchase
cases, an individual using due diligence should have perceived that the
Chinese banks wanted to shift the risk of non-payment of the loans from
themselves to the purchasers of the boats by being named the beneficiaries
on the standby letters of credit.248 The presentation requirement in both cases
2
4Id. at 1316 (noting that after the lawyer he retained to look at the sales contract expressed
concern over the BOA letter of credit, Jaffe refused further advise or assistance from the lawyer).
245Id. at 1316 (noting that he was also aware that the credit was irrevocable).
246Id.
24 71d at 1317.
2481d. at 1304-05 (alleging in the Verified Complaint that Foshan had "provided the letter of
credit to its bank Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) as security for debts unrelated to the Jaffe
project"). See also Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., 395 F. App'x 583, 585 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that
the contract required the credit to provided collateral security for ABC to make loans to Foshan for
the construction of the boats). This should have been clearly apparent to Jaffe when he approved
the amendment to the original letter of credit changing the beneficiary from Foshan to ABC. See
Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff'd 395 F. App'x 583
(11th Cir. 2010). See 2002 Irrevocable Tr. for Richard C. Hvizdak v. Shenzhen Dev. Bank, Co.,
Ltd., No. 2:08-cv-556-FtM-36DNF, 2010 WL 11512368, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2010), aff'dsub
nom. 2002 Irrevocable Tr. for Richard C. Hvizdak v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 428 F. App'x 924
(1Ith Cir. 2011). In order for the Shenzhen to draw on the letters of credit, it had to make working
capital loans to Foshan. Id. at *5. Any prudent businessman could have determined that the letters
of credit were to collateralize the Shenzhen's loan to Foshan. Id. The loan made by the Bank to
Foshan was $5 million dollars and each letter of credit was for $2.5 million dollars. Id. at *1.
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was merely a letter stating the amount of the unpaid loan balance
accompanied with a draft in that amount,24 9 without any requirement for
documentation of the loan, payments under the loan, or other matters. This
should have been a serious concern for a prudent businessman but was
apparently unimportant to the purchasers who failed to adequately protect
themselves.
VIII.RECOMMENDATION TO UNTETHER THE FRAUD EXCEPTION AND
TO LIBERATE THE INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE, MAKING IT A TOTALLY
UNCONDITIONAL UNDERTAKING
There is no doubt that the law of fraud is applicable to restrain those who
take advantage of others, especially those who are least able to protect
themselves from fraudsters. But when a rule of law is specifically designed
to protect one who is able to protect himself and brings detriment in terms of
significant economic costs and time to a completely innocent party, that rule
of law should be changed. Letters of credit are used by sophisticated
businessmen and entities who have the resources to adequately protect
themselves, either personally or through hired professionals. Issuers should
not be required to be involved in disputes between the applicant and the
beneficiary which could easily have been avoided or neutralized through
proper drafting of documents.
Times have changed. What could have been justified in the dark ages of
commercial transactions is no longer true. Assertions that the fraud exception
plays a vital role in the commercial utility of letter of credits is a bold
assertion, but the litigation time and economic costs associated with its
application are too high. It is time for applicants of letters of credit to protect
themselves, which is easier to do today with the sophistication of digital
communications relating to financial information, especially in the case of
commercial letters of credit. Thus, the author proposes that the payment
obligation under a letter of credit be injunction proof leaving the disappointed
applicant to seek redress from the beneficiary. While this may entail traveling
across the world to litigate in an unfavorable venue and incurring the initial
costs of litigation, it leaves the issuer/confirmer out of the litigation circle and
allows them to do what they are fully competent to do-evaluate the risks
24
9See Jaffe v. Bank ofAm., N.A., 395 F. App'x 583, 585 (11th Cir. 2010) (requiring a certified
statement that the amount of the draft represents the unpaid balance of the loan due to ABC from
Foshan); see also 2002 Irrevocable Tr., 2010 WL 11512368, at *5 (stating that the draw request
only had to represent the unpaid indebtedness due the Shenzhen by Foshan).
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associated with issuing a letter of credit for a particular applicant and
honoring a presentation that strictly conforms to the terms and conditions of
the letter of credit. If in the remote chance that an issuer/confirmer acquires
actual knowledge of a forged or fraudulent document in the presentation or
has actual knowledge of material fraud in the underlying transaction, they
can dishonor the presentation.
In order to achieve the result suggested by the author of this Article,
Section 5-109 of the U.C.C. needs to be revised to read as follows:
(a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly
to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of
credit, but the issuer has actual knowledge that a required
document is forged or materially fraudulent, or honor of the
presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the
beneficiary on the issuer or applicant:
(1) the issuer shall honor the presentation, if honor is
demanded by (i) a nominated person who has given
value in good faith and without notice of forgery or
material fraud, (ii) a confirmer who has honored its
confirmation in good faith, (iii) a holder in due course of
a draft drawn under the letter of credit which was taken
after acceptance by the issuer or nominated person, or
(iv) an assignee of the issuer's or nominated person's
deferred obligation that was taken for value and without
notice of forgery or material fraud after the obligation
was incurred by the issuer or nominated person; and
(2) the issuer, acting in good faith, shall dishonor the
presentation.
(b) A court of competent jurisdiction may not temporarily or
permanently enjoin the issuer from honoring a presentation
or grant similar relief against the issuer or other persons.
These proposed changes to the Uniform Commercial Code will free the
letter of credit from the meddling of courts in their perceived fairness which
has impaired the usefulness of the letter of credit as a commercial vehicle to
speed payment and shift knowable risks. The tether of the fraud exception
will be gone, and the issuer will no longer have a conditional obligation to
honor, but a totally unconditional, independent one. While this change would
apply to both commercial letters of credit and to standby letters of credit, its
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most significant impact will be in standby letters, in part because there is
substantially less litigation on commercial letters than standby credits. These
changes will force an applicant to think long and hard before entering into a
clean letter of credit transaction and will perhaps lead to more negotiation
among the parties concerning the nature of the documents that need to be
presented for honor. A world that thinks ahead is better than one that waits
until things turn sour.
